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OVERVIEW
Part 1, the Literature Review, introduces the phenomenon o f impaired self-awareness 
after brain injury. Examples o f theoretical models influential in the understanding of 
impaired self-awareness are described. A review of the empirical literature on the 
role o f executive function in impaired self-awareness after brain injury is reported, 
which includes ten relevant studies. Impaired executive functioning was found to be 
associated with impaired self-awareness in the majority o f these studies. This is 
despite variations in the way impaired self-awareness and executive functions were 
assessed, and mixed patient samples.
Part 2, the Empirical Paper, reports a study aiming to assess the relationship o f 
executive function and metacognition to impaired awareness o f deficit after brain 
injury. Impaired self-awareness was measured by the discrepancy between patient 
and significant other’s report on a questionnaire asking about functional deficits. The 
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test assessed executive function, and patients were 
asked to rate their confidence in each guess in order to assess metacognition. No 
statistical associations were found between the cognitive measures and impaired self- 
awareness. However, anxiety and depression levels were associated with awareness 
of deficits. Impaired self-awareness was greater in patients with frontal brain lesions. 
Level o f brain injury severity was not associated with self-awareness.
Part 3, the Critical Appraisal, discusses the process of arriving at this topic o f study, 
the challenges posed by the research setting and ethical considerations. Limitations 
o f the study design are discussed in further depth.
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PART 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
A Review o f the Empirical Literature examining the Role o f Executive Function 
in Impaired Self-Awareness after Brain Injury
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Abstract
This review discusses the phenomenon of impaired self-awareness after brain injury. 
Examples o f theoretical models influential in the understanding o f impaired self- 
awareness are described. On a cognitive level, executive processes are implicated in 
the construction o f self-awareness. A review o f the empirical literature on the role o f 
executive function in impaired self-awareness after brain injury is reported, in which 
ten relevant studies are reviewed. The most prevalent method o f assessing impaired 
self-awareness has been by questionnaire. Impaired executive functioning was found 
to be associated with impaired self-awareness in the majority o f studies. This is 
despite variations in the way impaired self-awareness and executive functions were 
assessed, and mixed patient samples with regard to severity and cause o f brain injury, 
lesion location, time since injury, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and whether they 
had received rehabilitation. Recommendations for future research are made.
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1.Introduction
This review will discuss the phenomenon o f impaired self-awareness after brain 
injury. The curious and wide-ranging ways in which it can manifest will be 
described. Research findings on its association with location of brain injury, severity 
o f brain damage and general intellectual ability will be outlined. Examples o f 
theoretical models influential in the understanding o f impaired self-awareness will be 
covered. A review o f the empirical literature on the role o f executive function in 
impaired self-awareness after brain injury will be reported, with implications for 
future research.
2. Impaired Self-Awareness after Brain Injury
2.1 The Clinical Phenomenon
Disorders o f self-awareness are common following neurological injury and illness. 
Approximately 30% o f severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) patients show residual 
impairment o f self awareness months and years after their injury (Prigatano & 
Altman, 1990). Typical examples include denial o f hemiplegia, blind patients who 
insist they can see, and those with amnesia who claim their memory is intact. Several 
terms have been used in the literature to refer to this phenomenon, including 
anosognosia, impaired self-awareness, and denial. In this review the term "impaired 
self-awareness" (ISA) will be used.
An individual can have impaired awareness for virtually any neurological or 
functional deficit. The definition given by Prigatano (1996) is “the clinical
phenomena in which a brain dysfunctional patient does not appear to be aware o f 
impaired neurological or neuropsychological function, which is obvious to the 
clinician and other reasonably attentive individuals. The lack o f awareness appears 
specific to individual deficits and cannot be accounted for by hyperarousal or 
widespread cognitive impairment” (pp80-81).
Disorders o f self-awareness vary with regard to the kind o f deficit o f which 
awareness is impaired, whether the impaired awareness is seen across all deficits a 
patient may present with, and whether the implications o f these deficits for 
functioning are acknowledged by the patient. The range o f presentations will be 
described in detail later.
2.2 The Importance o f Understanding Impaired Self-Awareness
It is important to develop an understanding of ISA for several reasons. A greater 
understanding o f ISA would be relevant to a range of disorders. The phenomenon of 
ISA is seen after brain injury o f  various causes, as well as in psychiatric conditions 
such as Alzheimer's Dementia and Schizophrenia. Therefore a better understanding 
o f it could inform the assessment, management and rehabilitation o f these conditions.
ISA interferes with the rehabilitation o f brain-injured patients in a number o f ways. It 
interferes with collaborative goal setting and patients' motivation. Fleming, Strong & 
Ashton (1998) found that patients not aware o f their rehabilitation needs show poor 
motivation and set unrealistic goals for themselves. They may comply poorly with 
treatment (Lam, McMahon, Priddy, & Gehred-Schultz, 1998; Malec, Smigielski, &
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DePompolo, 1991) and develop fewer compensatory strategies (Ownsworth, 
McFarland, & Young, 2000). For such reasons many authors share the view that 
rehabilitation interventions should focus on enhancing individual self-awareness of 
deficits (Sherer et al., 1998). A better understanding o f ISA would allow better 
tailoring o f interventions to the individual patient.
As well as affecting engagement with rehabilitation, ISA has a detrimental effect on 
functional outcome after rehabilitation programmes. Ratings o f ISA made early on in 
rehabilitation after TBI were found to relate to measures o f functional independence 
at discharge and were predictive o f later employment (Sherer, Hart & Nick, 2003). A 
similar outcome was seen for patients with brain injury as a result o f cerebrovascular 
accidents (Jehkonen et al., 2000).
2.3 Characteristics o f Impaired Self Awareness after Brain Injury
The phenomenon o f ISA manifests in a variety o f ways. Patients are more likely to 
acknowledge motor and sensory impairments than cognitive, social or emotional 
changes in functioning (Fleming & Strong, 1999; Hibbard & Gordon, 1992; Toglia 
& Kirk, 2000).
ISA can vary with regard to ‘extension’ o f awareness. This is the extent to which the 
deficit is comprehended. A patient can have knowledge that a deficit exists but not an 
appreciation o f the consequences o f the deficit. For example, Rubens & Garrett 
(1991) described patients who were aware that they had aphasia but who were not 
aware o f errors in speech as they made them. The opposite dissociation has also been
10
seen (Marcel, Tegner, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004). ISA also varies in ‘specificity’ o f 
awareness. This is the degree to which impaired awareness is restricted to a 
particular deficit or whether it is present for all deficits a patient may have. ISA can 
also vary with ‘partiality’ o f awareness. This is whether unawareness o f the deficit 
is complete (Schacter & Prigatano, 1991). For example, patients’ presentations 
sometimes imply some degree o f awareness o f their deficit. Bisiach and colleagues 
(Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; Bisiach & Berti, 1987) reported that most patients with 
hemiplegia who verbally deny their disability usually seem to accept it implicitly by 
staying in bed or using a wheelchair.
In addition to this variety o f presentations, ISA can change over time (Prigatano, 
1999). Observations suggest that immediately after injury many patients grossly 
overestimate their abilities across a broad range o f functions. Over time awareness of 
deficits can increase for a proportion o f patients (Fleming et al., 1999; Ownsworth, 
Clare, & Morris, 2006). Godfrey, Bishara, Partridge, & Knight (1993) found that the 
development o f awareness o f deficits is most pronounced between approximately 6 
and 12 months post-injury. Approximately 30% of severe TBI patients show residual 
ISA months and years after their injury (Prigatano et al., 1990).
Those patients with ISA persisting months and years after their TBI show bilateral 
and asymmetric lesions throughout the brain, including the brain stem and 
cerebellum (Prigatano et al., 1990). This suggests that persistent problems o f ISA 
after TBI may require bilateral diffuse cerebral dysfunction (Prigatano, 1999).
Sherer, Hart, Whyte, Todd, & Yablon (2005) found that ISA was significantly 
associated with the number but not with the location or volume o f focal lesions early
after TBI. They took this finding to imply that ISA may reflect disruption in the 
integrated operation o f broadly distributed networks, with lesion burden in any 
specific region being less relevant than disruption across multiple regions. 
Neuroimaging studies in normals also help to shed light on the brain areas that may 
be involved in judgements made about the self. Under fMRI, the anterior medial 
prefrontal and posterior cingulate areas showed activation. There was also significant 
activation in the thalamus. These findings indicate that these may be important neural 
circuits in self-awareness (Johnson et al., 2002). However, ISA has also been seen 
after focal lesions in only deep brain structures. House & Hodges (1988) report a 
patient who denied hemiplegia and had an infarct in the right basal ganglia and 
showed no cortical damage.
Severity o f brain injury is often measured by the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS - 
Teasdale and Jennett, 1974) or the length o f Post-Traumatic Amnesia (PTA). The 
GCS score is correlated with duration o f coma and both of these measures are 
correlated with the amount o f damage to the central brain structures o f the corpus 
callosum, brainstem and cerebellum. There is no correlation between GCS or length 
o f coma with the amount o f damage to hemispheric regions (Wilson et al 1994). 
While measures o f injury severity aid communication between medical units and 
hospital staff, they have been criticised as being difficult measures to administer 
accurately. Duration o f coma is hard to estimate in less severely injured patients who 
have often recovered consciousness by the time they are admitted to hospital 
(Gronwall &Wrightson, 1980). There is controversy over the optimal time o f 
administration o f the GCS, as consciousness can fluctuate (Richardson, 2000). A 
patient’s clinical state in the first few hours after their brain injury may be
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contaminated by complications o f other injuries such as respiratory insufficiency or 
be confounded by sedative medication or the influence o f alcohol. The GCS had 
been criticised for being insensitive to injuries in the mild range (Kraus and Nourjah 
1989).
Evidence for a link between level o f  ISA and severity o f brain injury is mixed. 
Prigatano (1999) has reported a number o f studies reporting significant associations 
between severe brain injury and ISA but a similar number of studies fail to support 
this link (Allen and Ruff 1990; Anderson and Tranel 1989; Fleming et al 1998; 
Sbordone et al 1998). The mixed findings may be due to the shortcomings o f the 
measures used to assess injury severity. Alternatively the mixed findings may 
suggest that ISA can be present without damage to deep brain structures.
There have been mixed findings as to the role o f general intellectual impairment in 
ISA. A number of studies have failed to find a relationship between the degree o f 
ISA and generalised cognitive impairment (Burgess et al., 1998; Fleming Strong and 
Ashton 1998; McKinlay and Brooks 1984; Prigitano, Altman and O ’Brien 1990; 
McGlynn and Schacter 1989). These results suggest that ISA is due to a specific 
cognitive loss (eg Babinski 1914). This view is also supported by clinical reports of 
patients who have more than one deficit and are aware of one but not the other 
(Bisiach and Germiani, 1991). However other studies have reported evidence for 
general cognitive disturbance contributing to ISA after brain injury (eg Nathanson, 
Bergman and Gordon, 1952; Weinstein and Kahn, 1955; Ullman, 1962).
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3. Theoretical Models of Impaired Self Awareness
A range o f different explanations have been proposed to explain ISA after brain 
injury. Any comprehensive explanation o f ISA would have to be able to account for 
the characteristics described in the preceding section.
3 .1 Neurological model
The Hierarchy o f Brain Function model (Stuss & Anderson, 2004) presents a 
framework differentiating types o f consciousness. The core attribute o f each type o f 
consciousness is a particular type o f awareness. The model states that there are four 
operational levels. The first level, ‘arousal-attention’, is o f basic arousal processes 
required for any type of conscious awareness. The brainstem reticular formation, 
specific brainstem nuclei, and their projections to the thalamus and cortex are the 
neural basis for arousal and general responsiveness. The second level, involves 
processes such as attention, language and memory, which have their own inherent 
organisation and work at an automatic level. Disorders of self-awareness at this level 
are domain specific and depend on which process or module is damaged. These 
processes are thought to depend on various cortical and subcortical regions. The third 
level involves the executive functions (Stuss and Benson, 1986; Stuss, Shallice, 
Alexander and Picton, 1995). These integrate information from posterior brain 
regions and organise goal directed responses. These executive functions are thought 
to depend on frontal regions, in particular the lateral frontal lobes (Stuss and Levine, 
2002). They provide the capacity to sequence and integrate information, and provide
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drive, allowing action planning, inhibition, facilitation o f parietotemporal association 
cortices and working memory.
The fourth level is related to self-awareness. This is located in the frontal lobe and its 
limbic connections, with the right frontal lobe being thought crucial. Damage to 
these connections is thought to lead to the lack of a model o f the entire self.
These levels o f consciousness are hierarchically organised. Each level feeds forward 
to the higher levels with an analysis o f incoming information and can also feed 
backward to modulate the operations o f lower levels.
The model serves to delineate types o f human consciousness and their neurological 
correlates. It does not detail the individual cognitive processes involved in creating a 
model o f the self and therefore self-awareness. It does not address the variations in 
extension or partiality o f self-awareness that can occur. The model does not attempt 
to explain why patients tend to be more aware of some deficits than others, or why 
change can occur over time in ISA. Therefore it is of limited use in informing the 
assessment and rehabilitation o f deficits of self-awareness. It does not consider the 
self in a social or cultural context or the individual factors that may impact on self- 
awareness.
3.2 Multidimensional models
A number o f theories conceptualise self awareness as multifaceted and specify the 
cognitive, psychological and social processes it is thought to depend on.
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Allen & R uff (1990) contend that three levels o f processing influence patients’ report 
of deficits after brain injury. Firstly “awareness o f deficits” requires the ability to 
attend to, encode and retrieve information regarding the self The second level o f 
“appraisal” involves comparing current incoming information about the self with a 
pre-morbid set o f beliefs about the self Impaired cognitive function will interfere 
with these levels o f processing, affecting the patient’s ability to recognise functional 
deficits. The third level, “disclosure”, concerns the patients’ willingness to report 
self-perceptions to another person. This is proposed to involve a complex interaction 
o f neuropsychological and socio-psychological factors.
Levine’s (Levine 1990; Levine et al., 1991) Discovery Theory proposes that 
functional deficits have to be ‘discovered’ by the patient, and focuses on factors that 
can impede this process. The model was developed to explain unawareness o f 
sensory and motor deficits but can as well be applied to cognitive, emotional or 
social impairment. As the loss o f the function does not produce any immediate 
experience o f the loss, it must be ‘discovered’ by self-observation or inference.
When cognitive deficits interfere with the detection o f the deficit, ISA can result. The 
specific cognitive impairments involved are, however, unspecified in this model. The 
availability o f accurate and meaningful feedback from the environment is thought to 
promote realistic self-awareness over time, so a lack of such relevant information or 
opportunities to observe post-injury changes in functioning is held to be a crucial 
factor in the maintenance o f ISA.
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The above models hint at a distinction between beliefs about the self, and self- 
evaluation that may occur during a task. Crosson et al’s (1989) Pyramid Model of 
Self-Awareness explicitly states a distinction between three levels o f self-awareness 
that are arranged in a hierarchy. ‘Intellectual awareness’ is knowledge that a 
particular function is impaired. ‘Emergent awareness’ is the ability to recognise a 
problem in functioning when it occurs. This in turn is necessary for ‘Anticipatory 
awareness’. This is the ability to recognize that a problem is likely to occur during a 
particular task. In this model, intellectual awareness is held to be the first basic level 
required for the other subsequent levels o f emergent and anticipatory awareness to be 
possible.
Toglia and Kirk (2000) expand on the distinction of Crosson et al (1989) between 
‘intellectual awareness’ and the awareness present during performance o f  tasks, 
which they term ‘online awareness’. The models described so far have considered 
how some social and environmental factors may impact on self-awareness. Toglia 
and Kirk (2000) present the most comprehensive framework to explain ISA by 
incorporating themes from psychology, neuropsychology, social psychology and 
culture. Further, they propose self-awareness to be constructed from a dynamic 
interaction between intellectual and online awareness rather than being a relatively 
static construct. Intellectual awareness, defined as beliefs about the self stored in 
long-term memory, is relatively stable. Online awareness is the ability to monitor and 
evaluate performance within the stream of action. This is seen as relatively unstable, 
being more accurate in some situations than others and varying with the task. Factors 
influencing online awareness are one’s knowledge o f the task and its context, beliefs 
about one’s capabilities, and affective state. The results o f self-monitoring on a task
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are compared to expectations o f performance based on prior beliefs about personal 
ability. A discrepancy between how one performs a task and one’s expectations may 
lead to adjusting one’s strategy in performing the task. Self-evaluation o f task 
performance may lead to restructuring o f the stored beliefs about one’s abilities. 
Thus there are constant interactions between stored beliefs and online awareness.
Factors proposed to impede these processes with ISA resulting, include cognitive 
deficits, lack o f motivation, fatigue, task demands and context of the testing 
situation. Cognitive deficits that could interfere with this process are: Impaired 
perception o f errors during task performance (self-monitoring), impaired ability to 
adjust performance (self-regulation), impaired ability to compare the outcome of 
performance with expectations about performance (self-evaluation), and impaired 
adjustment o f long-term beliefs about one’s abilities resulting from self-evaluation 
(Toglia and Kirk, 2000).
The model encompasses psychological factors that influence these processes: 
personality, specific beliefs about one’s strengths and limitations, general self- 
efficacy beliefs, affective state, motivation to perform well on the task, the meaning 
of the task to the individual, its perceived difficulty, whether the individual has been 
exposed to similar tasks before. The influence o f the social context is also addressed, 
in terms o f what task failure or success would mean to the patient, and who is asking 
that the task be carried out.
As the model considers the role o f psychological and social factors it can incorporate 
ideas about the role o f psychological ‘denial’ and culture in ISA. Weinstein and
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Kahn (1955) suggested that ISA may be a defence reaction in the form of 
emotionally motivated denial. This would serve to protect self-esteem by not 
acknowledging a functional impairment which would impact on personal control and 
independence. Indeed, refusal to acknowledge illness or putting it out o f one’s mind 
is seen in many disabling conditions (Caplan & Shecter, 1987) and is seen as a way 
o f coping with stress. Support for this idea comes from studies linking ISA to certain 
personality traits (Prigitano & Klonoff, 1998). However other studies using 
systematic questionnaires have failed to find distinctive personality traits associated 
with ISA (Levine et al 1991; Starkstein et al 1992; Small & Ellis 1996).
Studies carried out in brain injury samples across cultures throw light on how 
cultural attitudes may influence patients’ self report o f deficits they experience. A 
study by Prigitano et al (1997) found that Japanese patients with TBI did not 
overestimate social or emotional control problems but they did overestimate their 
self-care abilities. This was in contrast to a United States sample who overestimated 
social-emotional skills and underestimated self-care skills. This finding was 
interpreted as being due to the fact that self-care activities and the ability to be 
independent are highly valued in Japanese culture.
Toglia and Kirk’s (2000) model presents a comprehensive account o f how self 
awareness may be constructed. The model has the advantage o f proposing testable 
links between different factors. It has implications for rehabilitation assessment and 
intervention methods as it specifies the factors that may be contributing to ISA. It has 
the capacity to explain the range o f presentations of ISA with the dynamic influences 
o f different factors.
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Vuilleumier (2004) proposes another means by which affect may be involved in the 
development of ISA. This may be in the form of an abnormal affective drive to 
respond to uncertainties about current bodily states or current cognitive abilities 
(Vuilleumier, 2000). Affective signals can exert influences on cognitive processing 
and may be necessary to activate the appraisal operations that allow the adjustment 
o f behaviour and beliefs in the face o f novel situations (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). A 
reduced emotional impact o f perceived failure might contribute in this way to impede 
discovery o f the deficit by the patient, beside any cognitive impairment. This 
explanation, although not explicitly included in Toglia and Kirk’s (2000) model, 
could be incorporated into it as a way in which affective state may influence ISA.
Summary
The existing theoretical models o f ISA vary with regard to the scope o f their 
explanation o f the different presentations o f ISA, the level o f explanation on which 
their emphasis lies (neurological, neuropsychological, psychological, social), and 
how useful they are in informing intervention in and management o f patients with 
ISA.
From this brief review o f the theories of ISA it is clear that no single deficit on any 
level o f explanation (neuropsychological, psychological, social) is proposed to 
account for ISA. Further, it is unlikely to be explained by any unique combination of 
deficits, given the mixed findings with regard to the relationship o f ISA to 
intellectual function, injury severity and lesion location. Variations in ISA with type
20
of deficit, extension, specificity and partiality, and its changes over time point to 
complex and dynamic underlying mechanisms.
4. Measuring Impaired Self-Awareness
Markova and Berrios (2006) discuss the methods of measuring ISA and their various 
drawbacks. The most common way o f assessing ISA is to measure the discrepancy 
between the patient’s report o f deficits since brain injury and a carer/clinician’s 
report o f deficits. These methods assume that an accurate assessment o f the patients’ 
abilities is obtained by the carer/clinician. The patient’s report of their functioning 
may be influenced by a number o f factors. The patient may respond non- 
systematically due to an interaction between their cognitive deficits and their 
approach to the questionnaire, leading to variable and unpredictable responding. The 
carer/clinician’s perspective o f the patients functioning may be affected by stress, 
fatigue, lack of knowledge o f the brain injury, and frustration in managing the 
challenging behaviour. Any discrepancy between the patient’s self report and the 
report o f the carer/clinician is assumed to reflect a lack o f awareness o f deficits on 
the part o f the patient. This discrepancy is often totaled with the assumption that it is 
reflecting a quantifiable and continuous variable. Questionnaire and interview 
methods assess patients’ explicit ‘intellectual’ awareness only. The exclusive use o f 
assessment by such verbal means results in neglect o f behavioural manifestations o f 
ISA and o f patients’ ‘online’ awareness.
Alternatively, the discrepancy between the patient’s rating o f their performance on a 
task and a rating o f their objective performance can be used as an indication o f their
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‘online’ self-awareness. However this means that only their awareness o f their ability 
to carry out that particular task is assessed. It cannot be assumed that this will reflect 
their general self-awareness.
Alternatively, awareness can be rated by clinicians involved in the care o f the patient. 
This requires that the clinician be sufficiently familiar with the patient, and utilises 
their experience o f dealing with such presentations.
The variety o f methods of assessing ISA and their various shortcomings indicate that 
measuring ISA is not a straightforward exercise. Variations in the methods to assess 
ISA and their accuracy is likely to have contributed to the mixed findings in studies 
relating ISA to injury severity, lesion location and general intellectual ability.
5. Executive Function
According to Spreen & Strauss (1998), executive function describes “a 
multidimensional construct that refers to a variety of loosely related higher-order 
cognitive processes, that are necessary for effective and contextually appropriate 
behaviour” (p. 171). Godefroy (2003) places the emphasis in his definition o f 
executive functions on those which operate in “non-routine situations such as novel, 
conflicting or complex tasks” . Stuss and Alexander (2000) state that executive 
functions are distinct processes that can be differentiated but which converge on the 
general concept o f control functions. Thus, definitions o f executive function vary in 
the emphasis they place on facilitating control of appropriate behaviour, behaviour in 
new or complex situations, and whether they are loosely related or are distinct.
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Executive processes include initiation, planning, hypothesis generation, cognitive 
flexibility, decision making, self-regulation, judgement, feedback utilisation and self­
perception (Spreen and Strauss, 1998). Godefroy (2003) adds to this list response 
suppression, focussed attention, rule deduction, maintenance and shifting o f set, 
problem solving, and information generation. Lezak (2004) summarises executive 
function with four broad groupings. Volition is the capacity for intentional 
behaviour, requiring the capacity to formulate an intention and goal. Motivation and 
awareness o f self is a prerequisite for this. Planning is the identification and 
organisation o f steps and elements needed to carry out an intention or achieve a goal. 
This requires the ability to view oneself in the environment in an objective fashion 
and to conceive o f alternatives and make choices. Good impulse control, intact 
memory functions and sustained attention are also prerequisites. Purposive action is 
the translation of an intention or plan into productive self serving activity, requiring 
initiation, maintenance and switching o f set, and stopping sequences o f complex 
behaviour in an orderly and integrated manner. Effective performance involves self­
regulation, productivity, flexibility and capacity to shift set.
Support for the notion that executive functions can be distinguishable from each 
other comes from studies showing dissociations between them. Burgess et al (1998) 
conducted a factor analysis o f 92 brain injury patients’ performance o f executive 
tests. Ten measures of executive function were found to load on three cognitive 
factors -  Inhibition, Intentionality and Executive Memory. This supports the notion 
that different executive tests measure a number of different cognitive processes and 
that there may be limits to the fractionation of the executive system.
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Impairment on executive function tests can be seen without impairment on tests of 
general intellectual status (Kolb & Whishaw, 1995).
However, constructing tests o f executive function comes with challenges. Tests often 
have an inherent structure, so skills like initiation, planning and judgement are hard 
to test as the test or the examiner will provide them (Lezak, 2004). As well as this, 
Godefroy (2003) states that most tests involve several executive and non-executive 
processes, so determining the underlying cause o f impaired performance is difficult, 
and several factors have to be controlled before such interpretation is possible. Tests 
often engage multiple and coordinated executive processes, so impairment on the test 
cannot be attributed to a single deficit. According to Tranel (1992) very few tests o f 
executive function have shown high sensitivity and specificity.
6. Executive Function and Impaired Self Awareness
Initial evidence to support the role o f frontal lobes, and the executive functions 
related to them, in self-awareness was based on case studies of individuals with 
frontal lobe pathology who showed awareness deficits (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989). 
The review o f theories o f ISA highlighted several cognitive processes that were 
deemed important in the construction o f self-awareness. These included self­
monitoring, self-regulation, self-evaluation and updating o f long-term beliefs (Toglia 
and Kirk, 2000). These processes appear to overlap with cognitive processes deemed 
to form the executive functions, such as feedback utilization, self-regulation, 
appraisal, judgement, and hypothesis generation. During the last 15 years various
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researchers have examined the relationship between executive function and ISA 
(Prigitano, 2005).
7. A Review of Studies of the Relation of Executive Function to Impaired Self- 
Awareness
7.1 Aims
The aim o f this review is to examine the empirical literature on the role o f executive 
function in ISA after brain injury. The review will aim to describe how far this 
question has been addressed in previous research, the methods used to answer this 
question, and to summarise the findings. This will help to highlight gaps and guide 
future research into understanding self-awareness.
7.2 Method
The electronic Medline database was searched covering the years 1984 to January 
2007 to locate relevant studies The search terms used were (executive function) and 
(((stroke) or (brain injury)) and ((self awareness) or (self-awareness) or (awareness) 
or (insight))). Studies were included in the review if they met the following criteria:
1. The sample under study were people with an acquired brain injury
2. Self-awareness was measured
3. Executive function was measured
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4. The association between the executive function measure and self-awareness 
was explored in the statistical analysis
7.3 Results
Ten studies fulfilling the inclusion criteria were found. These are summarized in 
Table 1 and numbered from 1 - 1 0 .
It was decided to review the studies according to their method o f assessing ISA. 
Most studies used a measure o f “intellectual” self-awareness assessed by 
questionnaires and interviews.
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Table 1. Studies found in literature search.
Study A uthors Sam ple E xecutive F unction  m easure ISA  m easure R esult
N um ber
1 Burgess. 92 mixed 1.M odified W isconsin Card Sorting Test D E X 1 DEX correlated with verbal fluency FAS and animals. MWCST
Alderman. aetiology general (M W CST) categories and perseverative errors. 6 element test, Trails A and
Evans. Em slie. neurology 2.Cognitive estimates test B
& Wilson patients 3.verbal fluency FAS
(1998) 4.verbal fluency animals
5.Trails A and B
6 .Sim plified 6 elements test
2 Ownsworth. 61 with Brain 1.Health and Safety subtest from Independent SA D I2 ILS and all ISA scores correlated.
McFarland, & Injury o f  various Liv ing Scales (ILS) SRSI1 TTT correlated with 2 aspects o f  SRSI
Young (2002) causes 2.Tinker toy test (TTT)
Both classed into Impaired or Normal
1 Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX- Burgess et al, 1996)
'  Self Awareness of Deficits Interview (SADI -  Fleming et al, 1996)
3 Self Regulation of Skills Interview (SRSI - Owns worth et al. 2000)
Bogod. 
Mateer. & 
Macdonald 
(2003)
45 with TBI 1 .Reversal go -  no -g o  
2.Victoria Stroop
3.S elf ordered pointing task (SOPT)
DEX
SADI
SADI correlated with all executive scores.
In multiple regression. SADI predicted by SOPT. go-no-go. 
SADI and DEX not associated.
4 G overover
(2004)
33 acute phase o f  
BI with multiple 
aetiologies.
1.Toglia Category Assessment (TCA)
2. Deductive reasoning test. (DR)
Pre and post task 
question on how well 
they think they 
will/thought they will 
do. Rated as 0. 1 or 2.
ISA score correlated w ith TCA. not DR.
5 Ownsworth &
McFarland
(2004)
28 long term 
Brain Injun-
1.Health and Safety subtest o f  ILS
2. Tinker Toy Test
SRSI ISA correlated w ith Health and Safety subtest o f  ILS
6 Schmitter- 
Edgecom be & 
Woo (2004)
31 Closed Head 
Injury
1. verbal fluency FAS
2. Stroop
3.Trails A and B
4. W isconsin Card Sorting Test
5.Initiation perseveration on Dementia Rating 
Scale (DRS I/P)
Pre-task and post­
task prediction o f  
how much they could  
remember
Pre-task prediction correlated w ith trails, stroop. DR S I'P. 
No correlation between memory post-task prediction and 
executive tests
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Hart. Whyte. 36 patients with Composite score derived from 8 measures: 
Kim. & moderate and 1.Stroop
Vaccaro severe TBI 2.Trails B
(2005) 3. W isconsin Card Sorting Test
4. verbal fluency FAS
5.Regard's 5 point test
6.D igit backwards
7.Peterson Auditory Consonant trigrams 
8..Petrides" Self-ordered pointing task
DEX Correlations between ISA and executive com posite score.
8 N oe et al. 62 
(2005)
1.WCST
2.colour trails
3.verbal fluency
PCRS4 High and low  ISA groups differed on W CST and verbal 
fluency, not on Trails a and b. Independent predictors o f  ISA  
were WCST categories
9 Ownsworth & 67 1.Health and Safety subtest o f  Independent SADI 3 executive function factors found: Idea generation. Plan
Fleming Living Scales SRSI Execution. Error Self-regulation.
(2005) 2. Five Point Test
3.FAS ISA correlated with Idea Generation and Error self-regulation
4.Key Search
5.Tinker Toy Test
10 Anson & 
Ponsford 
(2006)
Six Elements Test from B.ADS PCRS 
S.ADI
No correlations between SADI and executive function score or 
PCRS and executive function score
4 Patient Competency Rating Scale (PCRS - Prigatano et al., 1986)
7.3.1 Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX- Burgess, Alderman, Wilson, & Emslie, 1996)
The Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX- (Burgess et al., 1996) is a questionnaire 
measure of a patient’s intellectual awareness of deficits. It covers twenty of the most 
commonly reported symptoms of the dysexecutive syndrome. The questions ask about 
four areas of likely change: emotional or personality, motivation, behavioural, and 
cognitive, and whether they are being experienced currently. The respondent is required 
to rate from 0 to 4 how often they experience each symptom. There is one version for 
the patient and one for a significant other who preferably has daily contact with them. 
The discrepancy between these scores is used as a measure of self-awareness.
A number of the questions have double clauses, and use language that perhaps not all 
respondents would be familiar with, for example, the word “lethargic”. This may cause 
problems for respondents in answering the questions. The questionnaire assesses the 
specific symptoms associated with dysexecutive syndrome. It does not ask about 
activities o f daily living or motor or sensory deficits. Its use therefore has the potential to 
miss deficits of awareness related to these areas.
The DEX was used in 3 of the studies (1,3,7). Study 1 looked at the ecological validity 
of ten tests of executive function. It found that the DEX discrepancy score was 
correlated with six out o f the eight measures of executive function used. These were the 
Modified Wisconsin Card sorting Test (MWCST) Categories and Perseverative Errors 
score, Verbal Fluency ‘FAS’ and ‘animals’ test, Trails A and B, and the Simplified Six 
Elements Test (SET). It was not correlated with the Cognitive Estimates Test or 
MWCST Total errors score. The study used a large sample of 92 patients who were of
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mixed aetiology of brain injury as they were recruited from a general neurology clinic. 
An advantage of this study was the use of several executive function tests allowing 
examination of which executive function may be related to ISA and which not. The 
particular tests were chosen to represent two verbal tasks, two non-verbal tasks and one 
(SET) that has shown dissociation from performance on other executive tests at the 
single case level (eg Shallice and Burgess 1991). There was no correlation between the 
DEX discrepancy score and measures of memory, general intellectual function or 
language, indicating that impairment of these abilities was not contributing in a 
systematic fashion to lack of awareness of deficits.
Study 3 found no correlation between the DEX discrepancy score and three measures of 
executive function: the Reversal Go-No-Go, Victoria Stroop, and Self Ordered Pointing 
Task. In this study it was rehabilitation therapists who completed the Significant Other 
form of the DEX. It could be that these therapists may not be able to rate the items of the 
DEX as accurately as family members, as done so in other studies using the DEX, due to 
limited contact with the patients. This may have led to the DEX discrepancy score being 
an invalid measure o f ISA. Another measure of intellectual awareness -  the Self 
Awareness of Deficits Interview (SADI) (which is described in detail below) was found 
to be correlated with the executive measures in this study. It could be that this is a more 
sensitive measurement tool. Alternatively the limited scope of the DEX - symptoms of 
the dysexecutive syndrome -  may have meant that deficits present in the sample were 
not detected. Supporting this notion, the two measures of awareness were only modestly 
correlated, suggesting they were not tapping exactly the same constructs or information.
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Study 7 used a composite score of eight executive tests, treating executive function as an 
inventory o f cognitive operations that may be tapped by different tests. They found the 
DEX discrepancy score to be modestly correlated with the executive composite score in 
the sample of 36 patients with post-acute moderate to severe brain injury. The use of a 
composite score in this study means that the relation of ISA to particular executive 
functions could not be examined.
7.3.2 Patient Competency Rating Scale (PCRS - (P/igatano et a l, 1986)
The Patient Competency Rating Scale (PCRS - (Prigatano et al., 1986) requires the 
patient and a close other to rate the ease with which the patient can perform 30 
functional activities of daily living, memory, interpersonal and social skills, and dealing 
with emotions, from 1 (can’t do) to 5 (can do with ease). The questions ask “How much 
of a problem do I have in ... ?”
The PCRS focuses on a range of functional skills, and seems easier to rate than the DEX 
as each item has the same structure and asks how much of a problem various tasks are. 
An advantage of this questionnaire is that scoring can be done in more than one way. A 
disadvantage of using the totalled score o f the discrepancy between self- and other - 
ratings is that it could be insensitive to differences that may exist for a small number of 
items. The actual magnitude difference between the subject's and respondent's ratings on 
specific items may also be used. However all of the studies described below used the 
totalled discrepancy score to quantify ISA.
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The PCRS was used in two studies (study 8 and 10). Study 8 used the PCRS as it had 
been validated for its sample of Spanish speakers. The aim of the study was to contribute 
to the understanding of ISA of disability after brain injury by looking at which factors 
predict ‘high’ and ‘low’ ISA. Despite this the study did not present a theoretical 
framework. The study used the total discrepancy score, the significant other’s form was 
completed by the treating neuropsychologist in the majority of cases and by the family 
in the rest o f them. Following from previous research they classed their patients as 
having either ‘high’ or Tow’ self awareness by using a cut-off score of 28 on the PCRS. 
The high and low awareness groups had significantly different scores on the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting test (WCST) and verbal fluency tasks but not the Trails A and B. A number 
of other neuropsychological tests, including the WAIS-III FSIQ, were also different for 
the high and low ISA groups. However, in a multivariate regression the WCST number 
of categories achieved and Delayed Free Recall of the TAVEC (a Spanish verbal 
memory test similar to California Verbal Learning Test) were independent predictors of 
ISA level.
Study 10 also used the total discrepancy score on the PCRS. No correlation was found 
between this score and the Six Elements Test. It could be that the PCRS discrepancy 
score was not a valid measure of ISA in this study. The Significant Others (SO) were 
asked to rate how well acquainted they were with the patient and all reported being at 
least “fairly well” acquainted with them. However the Self-Awareness of Deficits 
Interview (SADI) - an interview assessment method of intellectual awareness, described 
later -  which allows a more sensitive assessment of ISA was also not related to this 
executive measure. It is possible that the sample could have consisted of people with
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high self-awareness particularly as the sample was from a rehabilitation programme. On 
average they had spent 69 days in rehabilitation and 42% were between 1 and 7 years 
post-injury. Indeed the PCRS score for the patient and SO were significantly correlated. 
The mean PCRS discrepancy score was 0.9 (18.4) whereas in Study 8 the ‘high’ self 
awareness group had a score of 6.7 (9.5) (higher scores indicating lower levels of self- 
awareness). The Six Elements Test is a relatively demanding test of executive function 
as it requires planning and organisation by the patient for its successful performance. An 
alternative explanation for the lack of association between the SET score and ISA may 
have been that this test was too difficult for these patients. The SET scoring range is 
from 0 to 4, a relatively small scoring range and this may have been insufficient to 
capture the variability in executive functioning displayed by patients in this study. The 
sample was relatively small consisting of 33 TBI patients and so could have lacked 
statistical power. Of note is the finding that the PCRS and SADI scores were not 
correlated, indicating that they were not measuring the same construct.
7.3.3.Self Awareness o f  Deficits Interview (SADI -  Fleming, Strong &Ashton, 1996)
This is a semi-structured interview scored by the interviewer. It has the advantage that 
an experienced clinician is able to discuss experiences reported by the patient in detail. It 
is likely to ascertain a more accurate report of the patient’s experiences in comparison to 
the patient and relative answering questionnaire items according to their personal 
interpretations. A score sheet guides the interviewer’s scoring. The interviewer asks 
whether the patient or others have noticed changes in the patient’s functioning in 
physical abilities, memory/confusion, concentration, problem solving, decision making,
organising and planning, controlling behaviour, communication, getting along with 
people, personality, and any other problems. The interviewer then asks about what they 
hope to achieve in the future. A checklist is given to relatives to assist with scoring 
components of the interview. The interview gives three indices o f ‘intellectual’ 
awareness - self awareness of deficit, self awareness of functional implications of 
deficit, ability to set realistic goals. These indices allow examination of the “extension” 
of ISA, ie. how far the patient is aware of the deficit and its consequences. The indices 
are scored from 0 to 3. This could be criticised as being a crude scale, given that the 
interview covers a broad range of functioning. Four studies (2,3,9,10) used this 
interview measure of ‘ intellectual’ awareness. The studies will be evaluated after 
another interview measure often used alongside the SADI has been described .
7.3.4 Self Regulation o f Skills Interview* (SRSI - Ownsworth et al 2000)
Another interview measure of ISA is the SRSI. This is a semi-structured interview 
composed of six questions that assess self-regulation skills. The six questions are applied 
to an area of difficulty identified by the patient. Commonly, these are memory problems, 
impaired attention and concentration, depression, poor anger management, speech 
difficulties, lack of motivation and anxiety (Ownsworth et al 2000). Three indices are 
obtained on a 10 point scale: awareness, self-rated readiness to change, and strategy 
behaviour.
Three studies used the Self Regulation of Skills Interview (SRSI) (2,5,9). The studies 
using this interview make a distinction between intellectual and online awareness and
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intend the SRSI to measure online awareness. However as it relies on verbal report by 
the patient about performance on various tasks while the patient is not engaged in that 
task, it cannot be seen as a true measure of online awareness.
Study 2 used a sample of 61 severe brain injury patients. It used two measures of 
executive function. These were the Independent Living Scales’ Health and Safety 
subtest and the Tinker Toy test. The Independent Living Scales’ Health and Safety 
subtest assesses basic cognitive skills for daily living, asking 20 questions requiring 
common sense judgements about practical problems. Response quality is rated on a 2 
point scale. However it seems likely that response quality is likely to depend on skills 
such as memory, language, verbal ability as well as executive function. The Tinker Toy 
test is a test o f purposive behaviour -  a category of executive function involving 
productivity and self-regulation. The SADI total score was found to be correlated with 
the Independent Living Scales’ Health and Safety subtest. The study used the SADI total 
score and so did not make use of the sub-scales which measure important distinctions in 
the concept o f intellectual awareness. The Tinker toy test complexity score was 
associated with Readiness to change and Strategy behaviour but not the Awareness 
Index on the SRSI. In this study different executive functions were found to be 
associated with different aspects of awareness, suggesting that the specific aspects of 
ISA may depend on different cognitive processes.
Study 3 found the SADI to be correlated with all three measures of executive function 
used -  Reversal go-no-go, Victoria Stroop and Self-ordered pointing test. The individual 
factors of the SADI were not used. The SADI was negatively correlated with IQ,
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indicating that impaired intellectual function contributed to ISA for this sample. When 
IQ was partialled out from a regression analysis, the SADI was significantly predicted 
by the executive functioning measures, with the SOPT being the strongest predictor, 
followed by the Reversal Go-no-go and Stroop test.
Study 9 used five measures of executive function and after factor analysis found three 
factors: Idea Generation, Plan Execution, and Error self regulation. These seem to 
correspond to Lezak’s (2004) volition, purposive action, and performance effectiveness. 
The SADI was found to correlate with the factors of Idea Generation and Error self 
regulation. Individual factors of the SADI were not used. The SRSI Awareness index 
was found to correlate with Idea Generation and Error self regulation. The SRSI 
Strategy Behaviour Index correlated with the Idea Generation factor. IQ was not 
controlled for in this study.
Study 10 used the Six Elements Test to measure executive function. There was no 
correlation between the SADI and this test. It may be that the executive test was an 
inappropriate one for the sample of patients, or that the patients in this sample had low 
levels o f ISA. These possibilities have been discussed previously when Study 10 was 
reviewed in Section 7.3.2.
Study 5 found that patients with low scores on a measure of volition (the Health and 
Safety subtest of the Independent Living Scales) showed lower self awareness on the 
SRSI. The sample consisted of 28 long-term brain injury patients who had volunteered 
to take part in a rehabilitation program.
37
7.3.5 Impaired Self-Awareness assessed by rating o f performance on a task
Two of the ten studies (study 4 and 6) attempted to make a measure of online awareness. 
They asked patients direct questions about their performance on a task, and these 
responses were compared to an objective measure of performance. Consequently these 
measures of self-awareness were of a very specific ability. A drawback of this method is 
that patients may differ on how well they understand the task and what successful 
performance means, and how familiar they may be with such tasks. There is the 
possibility that patients may have ISA of abilities that are not being measured by the 
specific task.
Study 4 asked patients before and after they had performed two tests of executive 
function (Toglia Category Assessment and Deductive Reasoning Test) how well they 
thought they would do before they undertook the tests and how well they thought they 
had done after the tests. Their two answers were compared to their actual performance 
and they were given a rating of 0 to 2 to indicate their awareness of their performance. 
This means that they averaged across the important theoretical distinction between 
intellectual and online awareness and used this measure to represent ISA in general. ISA 
was found to be correlated with the Category Assessment task but not with the 
Deductive Reasoning task. The latter task may have been too demanding as it requires 
the patient to draw new conclusions from question to question within each trial, or it 
may have been too difficult to assess one’s performance on this task. In contrast ‘shifting 
set’ is only required from trial to trial on the Category Assessment Task. The sample
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was taken from an acute neurosurgery unit consisting of patients soon after their brain 
injury, which means they are likely to have had diffuse brain dysfunction and so such 
ratings may have been hard to make. It is also unlikely that they had had opportunities to 
‘discover’ any deficits they may have after their brain injury. This study was the only 
one of those included in this review to cite a power calculation. The study sample 
exceeded this number so low power is not likely to be a possible cause of the lack of 
association found.
Study 6 asked patients to predict how many units of material they thought they would 
remember in immediate and delayed recall and confidence ratings in their predictions 
before exposure to the material to be remembered, and after. This was done for the three 
memory tasks used -  Logical Memory I, Visual Reproduction I and II from the 
Wechsler Memory Scale Revised and list learning in the California Verbal Learning 
Test (CVLT). The pre-exposure question was designed to assess intellectual awareness, 
and the second post-exposure question was designed to assess online awareness. 
Predictions across the tasks were collapsed. As predictions of recall were made in terms 
of units o f material to be remembered, the ISA measure did not reduce itself to a crude 
measure. An advantage of this study was the use of a control group allowing comparison 
of task performance and predictions about performance to a normal group. This study 
found that the measure of intellectual awareness was correlated with three of the five 
executive tests used -  the Stroop task, Trails A and B, and the Initiation/perseveration 
scale from the Dementia Rating Scale. It was not related to the WCST or the FAS test. 
This relationship could not be attributed to a more generalised cognitive deficit as no 
relationship was found between ISA and IQ. There were no correlations between the
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online awareness measure and the executive tests. The authors explained this result as a 
consequence of online awareness being updated following exposure to the task. In other 
words patients used information from practice to update online memory of self- 
knowledge.
7.3.6. Issues in Measurement o f Impaired Self Awareness
There has been a strong tendency for studies to focus their assessment of ISA on one 
aspect of it: intellectual awareness. This may be because questionnaire methods are the 
easiest to administer in terms of time, expertise required on the part o f the researchers, 
and convenience, and these methods are able to assess intellectual awareness only. 
Measurement o f online awareness in the studies was through questions asked while a 
task was being carried out.
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The majority o f studies (7) assessed only one aspect of self-awareness. This meant that 
possible dissociations between different aspects of awareness or between different 
methods of assessment could not be demonstrated in these studies.
It seems that the SADI has the advantage of taking into account a carer's report, 
comparing this to patient's report, but allowing exploration of the precise nature of the 
awareness deficit, with the help of a structured interview and an experienced clinician. 
However this method requires more time on the researcher's part.
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The studies assessed ISA in a quantitative fashion. In doing so they conceptualised ISA 
as a continuous construct that can be quantified. The use o f a total score on 
questionnaires means that lack of awareness of a very small number of deficits that may 
be extreme may not be distinguishable from the score of a patient who shows no ISA but 
may have completed their questionnaire with slightly more optimism about their abilities 
than their relative.
Such methods do not take into account of the range of ways ISA can manifest. There can 
be variations in the extension of a patient’s knowledge of their deficit, and in its 
specificity and its partiality. There is a tendency for patients to acknowledge motor and 
sensory impairments more readily than cognitive social or emotional changes in 
functioning (Fleming & Strong, 1999). Some studies do not acknowledge the 
dissociation that can occur between intellectual awareness and online awareness. 
Quantitative assessment of ISA as a global construct does not take into account these 
qualitative differences in the phenomenon.
Interestingly, when the questionnaire measures of self-awareness (PCRS and DEX) were 
used with the SADI in studies, they were found not to be associated with the SADI. This 
reflects the impact that the method of assessment has on the measurement of ISA. It may 
reflect that different constructs are being tapped, or that one form of assessment is an 
inaccurate measure.
The SADI and SRSI do acknowledge the qualitative differences in ISA that can be 
present. Indeed in the study that used them both, they were found to be associated with
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different executive tests, suggesting that they may be tapping different constructs that 
may be dependent on distinct executive processes.
The SRSI has been used in studies as a measure of online awareness. The means of 
assessment is through verbal report by the patient about a deficit that they have 
identified, so this cannot be deemed to be a true measure of online awareness. Online 
awareness consists of the ability to recognize deficits in task performance as they occur, 
to anticipate them and to adjust performance accordingly. As such it needs to be 
assessed during the ‘live’ performance of a task. So far the studies attempting to do this 
have assessed ISA of performance of executive and memory tasks. Future studies should 
assess ISA of activities of daily living to make such assessment more ecologically valid 
and relevant to rehabilitation.
7.3. 7 Issues in the Measurement o f Executive Function
It is important to bear in mind some considerations when conducting executive function 
research. In their role in controlling behaviour, executive processes receive input from 
some subordinate processes and output through others. Therefore any measure of 
executive processes will inevitably be contaminated by any impairments of these slave 
processes. If a study compares patients’ performance across a range of tasks, the 
background demands are likely to differ greatly from task to task. Dissociations may 
arise because o f the differing influences of peripheral contributory factors and 
impairments of them (Burgess, 1997). Since the study samples had a range o f extent and
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location of damage, it is likely that impairments in cognitive processes other than 
executive abilities influenced task performance.
None of the studies reviewed attempted to control for the interference of specific 
peripheral processes in the performance of the executive tests. When dissociations arose 
between different executive tests they were interpreted as arising from the differential 
involvement of executive processes in aspects of self-awareness.
7.3.8 Sample Issues
Sample size in the studies ranged from 28 to 92. One study (study 4) cited the power 
calculation used to obtain its sample size. A few studies did not find support for their 
hypothesized associations between executive function and self-awareness. The 
possibility that these studies lacked statistical power cannot therefore be ruled out.
The majority of studies (7) used samples with mixed causes of brain injury. These 
included injury resulting from trauma, -  road traffic accidents, assaults, falls and other 
accidents -  cerebrovascular events, anoxia, hydrocephalus, neoplasm and encephalitis. 
One study (Study 4) used patients in the acute phase of non-traumatic brain injury who 
were awaiting surgery on the hospital ward. Two studies (study 6 and 10) used samples 
with TB1 patients only. The cause of brain injury has implications for the type of brain 
damage resulting. Penetrating head injuries may give rise to severe focal brain lesions 
(Russell 1951; Salazar et al 1986) as can cerebrovascular events, whereas closed head 
injuries are much more likely to lead to diffuse cerebral damage (Richardson 2000).
The studies varied in how severe the patients’ brain damage was. Patients’ severity of 
brain injury was classified using either the Glasgow Coma Scale (Teasdale and Jennett, 
1974), length of Post-traumatic Amnesia or length of coma. Two studies (2, 6) used 
patients who were all classified as “severe”, 3 used patients who were “moderate” to 
“severe” (7,8,10) and 3 (3,5,9) used patients whose injurity severity ranged from “mild” 
to “severe” . One study (1) reported excluding patients with “mild” injury, and another 
used patients in the acute phase of brain injury (4). Severity of brain damage is 
associated with damage to deep brain structures. With such varying cause and severity 
of brain damage, it is likely that the samples had widely different range and location of 
brain damage. This means that the damaged neural networks involved in the aetiology of 
ISA is likely to have varied widely within and across the samples in the studies 
reviewed.
The studies varied with regard to whether the reported their exclusion criteria. Three 
studies did not report any such criteria (2, 5, 10), so it is unclear how inclusive their 
samples were. Three studies (6, 7, 9) excluded patients who had a history of neurological 
disease or psychiatric disorder, severe past or current substance abuse. The study 
samples therefore varied with regard to inclusion of patients with premorbid disorders 
affecting the brain.
Location o f brain injury was not reported in the majority of studies. In those that did 
report this information, the samples were mixed with regard to lesion location and 
whether injury was diffuse or focal. Diffuse lesions usually lead to memory, attention
44
and concentration disabilities, impaired reasoning and general response slowing (Hsiang 
& Marshall, 1998).
McKinlay and Gray (1992) discuss the limitations of brain scanning methods and 
variations in scan results according to the time at which they are taken. CT scans are an 
unreliable guide to the extent of eventual cerebral damage, especially when they are 
carried out immediately after the injury. Scans carried out some months after injury will 
very often show damage that was not evident in early scans due to cell death or 
subsequent complications.
Across the study samples the mean length of time since injury was 0.8 years to 11 years. 
With single event brain insults, patients tend to make the most rapid gains in the first 
weeks and months following medical stabilisation (Bode and Heinemann 2002). 
Cognitive functions such as memory, attention and concentration generally continue to 
improve during the first 6 months to a year. Spontaneous improvements continuing 
beyond a year are generally slight (eg Geschwindl985). This means that patients across 
the samples would vary in their stage of recovery of brain function. Further, patients 
several years post-injury are likely to have had more opportunities to ‘discover’ their 
deficits.
Patients were recruited in the majority of studies from rehabilitation programmes. Their 
rehabilitation activities may well have impacted on their awareness of their deficits, and 
this is likely to have varied with the length of time spent in rehabilitation.
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7.4 Conclusions
It is not possible to make generalisations from the results of the studies described above 
to the general brain injury population about the relation of executive processes to ISA. 
This is because the samples were heterogeneous in terms of severity of injury, cause of 
brain injury, lesion location, time since injury, inclusion and exclusion criteria, whether 
they had received rehabilitation and their level of self awareness. However associations 
with executive function were found in the majority of studies. This was despite the use 
o f different ISA assessment methods, small samples, and different executive function 
tests. Therefore there appears to be a robust association between intellectual self- 
awareness and executive abilities.
7.5 Future Research
The use o f broader methods of assessing ISA would be desirable. Assessment methods 
should be informed by an understanding of the various ways in which ISA can manifest. 
Assessment by a single method does not capture the complex and multidimensional 
construct of self-awareness and general conclusions about ISA should not be drawn on 
the basis o f a single assessment. The definition of ISA could be refined into a number of 
dimensions, making use of the already described distinctions between extension, 
specificity and partiality, and the distinction between online and intellectual awareness. 
Thus ISA would be conceptualised as a multidimensional construct rather than a single 
score along a single dimension.
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Future research could focus on curious presentations of ISA, such as when ISA is 
restricted to only one deficit (specificity) or when ISA is expressed verbally but not 
behaviourally (partiality).
Future studies should bear in mind the difficulties in assessing executive function. The 
problem o f ‘task impurity’ (Burgess, 1997) should be borne in mind. Cognitive tests 
which are able to control for the subordinate cognitive processes involved in executive 
tests should be utilised.
Samples o f patients should be better delineated in terms of lesion location, time since 
injury, and exclude premorbid conditions that would impact on cognitive function.
Studies could move away from a correlational design and study the development o f self 
awareness over time. This could be informative as to which factors are pertinent in its 
development.
Future research could be informed by the understanding of ISA in other clinical 
disorders such as psychosis and Alzheimer’s Dementia. Cooke (2005) reviews the 
theories o f lack of insight in schizophrenia and the empirical research supporting these 
theories. Innovative strategies to study lack of insight include the assessment of 
‘metacognition’ alongside traditional executive tests (Koren et al 2004).
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8. Conclusions
Characteristics of the intriguing presentations of ISA after brain injury were described. 
The theoretical models of ISA after brain injury vary in their emphasis and usefulness 
for the management of the phenomenon. A model by Toglia and Kirk (2000) provides a 
comprehensive framework within which to conceptualise ISA. This incorporates 
neuropsychological, psychological, social and cultural factors. On a cognitive level, 
executive processes are implicated in the construction of self-awareness. A review of the 
empirical literature on the role of executive function in ISA after brain injury was 
carried out. Tens relevant studies were found. The most prevalent method of assessing 
ISA was by questionnaire, and thus most studies obtained a measure of ‘intellectual’ 
awareness of deficits. ‘Online’ awareness as a separate aspect of awareness was assessed 
in only one study (Schmitter-Edgecombe et al., 2004). Executive functioning was found 
to be associated with intellectual awareness in the majority of studies. This is despite 
variations in the way ISA and executive functions were assessed, and mixed samples 
with regard to severity of brain injury, cause of brain injury, lesion location, time since 
injury, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and whether they had received rehabilitation. 
Future research should be careful not to reduce the complex construct o f self-awareness 
to a single score, but should explore the dimensions along which it can vary. Care should 
be taken to choose appropriate cognitive tests and study samples.
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PART II: EMPIRICAL PAPER
Awareness o f Deficit after Brain Injury: 
the Role of Executive Function and Metacognition
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Abstract
The aim o f this study was to assess the relationship of executive function and 
metacognition to impaired awareness o f deficit after brain injury. Impaired self- 
awareness was measured by the Awareness Questionnaire discrepancy between 
patient’s and significant other’s report. The Brixton Test assessed executive function 
and patients were asked to rate their confidence in each guess in order to assess 
metacognition. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) was also 
administered. No statistical associations were found between the cognitive measures 
and impaired self-awareness. However anxiety and depression levels were associated 
with awareness o f deficits. Patients with frontal lesions had greater levels o f impaired 
self-awareness. Level of injury severity was not associated with self-awareness of 
deficits. In this heterogeneous sample of patients, impaired executive function and 
metacognition did not contribute to impaired self- awareness.
65
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Impaired Self Awareness after Brain Injury
Disorders of self-awareness are common following neurological injury and illness. 
Approximately 30% of severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) patients show residual 
impaired self-awareness months and years after their injury (Prigitano and Altman 
1990). Typical examples include denial o f hemiplegia, blind patients who insist they 
can see, amnesics who claim their memory is intact. In this study the term "impaired 
self-awareness" (ISA) will be used.
An individual can have impaired awareness for virtually any neurological or 
functional deficit. The definition given by Prigatano (1996) is “the clinical 
phenomena in which a brain dysfunctional patient does not appear to be aware of 
impaired neurological or neuropsychological function, which is obvious to the 
clinician and other reasonably attentive individuals. The lack o f awareness appears 
specific to individual deficits and cannot be accounted for by hyperarousal or 
widespread cognitive impairment” (pp80-81).
1.2 Characteristics of Impaired Self-Awareness after Brain Injury
The phenomenon can manifest in a variety of ways. Patients tend to be more likely to 
acknowledge motor and sensory impairments than cognitive social or emotional 
changes in functioning (Fleming and Strong, 1999; Hibbard and Gordon, 1992;
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Toglia and Kirk, 2000). The severity and type o f ISA can change over time 
(Prigitano, 1999).
ISA can vary with regard to ‘extension’ o f awareness. This is the extent to which the 
deficit is comprehended. A patient can have knowledge that a deficit exists but not an 
appreciation o f the consequences o f the deficit. For example, Rubens and Garret 
(1991) describe patients who are aware that they had aphasia but were not aware of 
errors in speech as they made them. The opposite pattern has also been seen (Marcel 
et al 2004). ISA also varies in ‘specificity’. This is the degree to which impaired 
awareness is restricted to a particular deficit or whether it is present for all deficits a 
patient may have. ISA can also vary with ‘partiality’ o f awareness. This is whether 
unawareness o f the deficit is complete (Schacter and Prigitano, 1991). For example, 
patients’ presentations sometimes imply some degree of awareness o f their deficit. 
Bisiach and colleagues (Bisiach and Germiniani, 1991; Bisiach and Berti, 1995) 
reported that most patients with hemiplegia who verbally deny their disability usually 
seem to accept it implicitly by staying in bed or using a wheelchair.
Many writers have emphasized the role o f the frontal lobes in self-awareness (e.g. 
Stuss 1991). Studies o f self-reflection in normals indicate that multiple brain areas 
are involved but they also indicate that the frontal lobes are o f particular importance 
(Gusnard et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2002). However, Sherer et al (2005) found that 
ISA was significantly associated with the number but not with the location or volume 
o f focal lesions early after TBI. They took this finding to imply that ISA may reflect 
disruption in the integrated operation o f broadly distributed networks, with lesion
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burden in any specific region being less relevant than disruption across multiple 
regions.
Evidence for a link between level o f ISA and injury severity is mixed. Prigatano 
(1999) presented a number o f studies reporting significant associations between 
severe brain injury and ISA, while a similar number o f studies fail to support this 
link (Allen and Ruff 1990; Anderson and Tranel 1989; Fleming et al 1998; Sbordone 
et al 1998). Possible reasons for this may be damage to differing underlying 
mechanisms in the creation o f ISA, or differences in the measurement o f ISA and 
severity o f injury.
There have been mixed findings as to the role o f general intellectual impairment in 
ISA. Many studies have failed to find a relationship between the degree o f ISA and 
generalised cognitive impairment (Burgess et al 1998; Fleming Strong and Ashton 
1996; McKinlay and Brooks 1984; Prigatano, Altman and O ’Brien 1990; McGlynn 
and Schacter 1989) while others have found some empirical support for the role of 
general cognitive disturbance in ISA after brain injury (eg Nathanson Bergman and 
Gordon 1952; Weinstein and Kahn 1955; Ullman 1962).
A number o f studies have noted an association between self-awareness o f deficits 
and emotional distress. Godfrey et al (1993) noted that better self-awareness was 
paralleled by greater emotional distress. Ranseen et al (1990) found that patients who 
rated themselves as less functionally competent showed greater levels o f depression. 
Heilbronner et al (1989) found that a group o f patients with better self-awareness
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were rated higher on measures o f depression than a group who had less self-
awareness.
1.3 Theoretical Model o f Impaired Self Awareness after Brain Injury
It is unlikely that a single deficit can for account for ISA. Further it is unlikely to be 
explained by any unique combination o f deficits, given the mixed findings with 
regard to the relationship o f ISA to intellectual function, injury severity and lesion 
location. Variations in ISA with type of disability, extension, specificity and 
partiality, and its changes over time point to complex and dynamic underlying 
mechanisms.
Toglia and Kirk (2000) propose self awareness to be constructed from a dynamic 
interaction between “intellectual” and “online” awareness rather than being a static 
construct. Intellectual awareness, defined as beliefs about the self stored in long term 
memory, is relatively stable. Online awareness is the ability to monitor and evaluate 
performance within the stream of action. This is seen as relatively unstable, being 
more accurate in some situations than others. The results of self monitoring are 
compared to expectations o f performance based on prior beliefs about personal 
ability. A discrepancy between how one performs a task and one’s expectations, may 
lead to selecting a different strategy in performance of the task. One’s self-evaluation 
of task performance can restructure the stored beliefs about one’s abilities. Thus 
there are constant interactions between intellectual awareness and online awareness.
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Factors proposed to impede these processes with ISA resulting include cognitive 
deficits, lack o f  motivation, fatigue, task demands and the context and meaning of 
the testing situation. The model presents a comprehensive framework to explain ISA 
incorporating themes from psychology, neuropsychology, social psychology and 
culture.
Cognitive deficits that could interfere with the construction o f self awareness are: 
impaired perception of errors during task performance (self monitoring), impaired 
ability to adjust performance (self regulation), impaired ability to compare the 
outcome o f performance with expectations about performance (self evaluation), and 
impaired adjustment o f long term beliefs about one’s abilities resulting from self 
evaluation (Toglia and Kirk, 2000)
1.4 Executive Function
Executive function has been defined as “a multidimensional construct that refers to a 
variety o f loosely related higher-order cognitive processes, that are necessary for 
effective and contextually appropriate behaviour” (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). 
Executive processes include initiation, planning, hypothesis generation, cognitive 
flexibility, decision making, self-regulation, judgement, feedback utilisation and self 
perception (Spreen et al., 1998). Godefroy (1993) adds to this list: response 
suppression and focussed attention, rule deduction, maintenance and shifting o f set, 
problem solving, and information generation.
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Following from Toglia and Kirk’s (2000) model, executive processes implicated in 
the creation o f self-awareness are feedback utilization, self-regulation, appraisal, 
judgement, and hypothesis generation. Initial evidence to support the role o f frontal 
lobes, and the executive functions related to them, in self-awareness was based on 
case studies o f individuals with frontal lobe pathology who showed awareness 
deficits (McGlynn and Schacter, 1989).
1.5 Studies o f Executive Function and Impaired Self-Awareness after Brain Injury
Several studies have explored the relationship between executive function and ISA. 
The samples o f patients in these studies have varied in terms o f severity o f injury, 
cause o f brain injury, lesion location, time since injury, inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, whether they had received rehabilitation and their level o f self-awareness. 
This makes it difficult to generalise from the results of these studies to the general 
brain injury population about the relation o f executive processes to ISA. However 
associations with executive function were found in the majority o f studies. This was 
despite the use o f different ISA assessment methods, small samples, and different 
executive function tests.
The most common way o f assessing ISA in these studies has been to measure the 
discrepancy between the patient’s report o f deficits since brain injury and a 
carer/clinician’s report o f deficits. This is the quickest and most convenient method 
to assess ISA.
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The Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX- Burgess, Alderman, Wilson, & Emslie,
1996) has been used to assess ISA in studies by Burgess et al (1998), Bogod et al
(2003) and Hart et al (2005). This questionnaire assesses awareness o f dysexecutive 
symptoms and so has the potential to miss ISA of other deficits. Burgess et al (1998) 
found the DEX discrepancy score to be associated with a number o f executive tests 
(FAS, Modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Six Elements Test, and Trails A and 
B) and Hart et al (2005) found the DEX discrepancy score to be associated with a 
composite score of eight executive tests. Bogod et al (2003) did not find an 
association between the DEX discrepancy score and three tests o f executive function 
(reversal go-no-go, Victoria Stroop, and Self Ordered Pointing Test). Another 
questionnaire, the Patient Competency Rating Scale (PCRS -  (Prigatano et al., 1986) 
was used to measure ISA in studies by Noe et al (2005) and Anson and Ponsford 
(2006). Associations were found with WCST and verbal fluency but not Trails A and 
B (Noe et al 2005). No association was found with the Six Elements Test (Anson and 
Ponsford, 2006).
Interview methods have also been used to measure ISA. These enable a richer and 
more sensitive measure o f ISA. The Self Awareness of Deficits Interview (SADI - 
(Fleming, Strong, & Ashton, 1996) score was associated with the Health and Safety 
subtest from the Independent Living Scales (a test o f volition) but not the Tinker Toy 
Test (Ownsworth et al, 2002). It was also associated with the reversal go-no-go, 
victoria stroop, and Self Ordered Pointing test (Bogod et al, 2003). Ownsworth and 
Fleming (2005) found it to be associated with executive function factors Idea 
Generation and Error Self regulation. Anson and Ponsford (2006) did not find the 
SADI to be associated with the Six Elements Test. The Self Regulation o f Skills
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Interview (SRSI - Ownsworth, McFarland, & Young, 2000) hasbeen used in several 
studies. Ownsworth et al (2002) found two indices o f this interview to be associated 
with the Tinker Toy Test. Ownsworth and McFarland (2004) found it to be 
associated with volition. Ownsworth and Fleming (2005) found indices o f this 
interview to be associated with executive factors of Idea Generation and Error Self 
regulation.
The above questionnaires and interview methods of assessing ISA assess patients’ 
explicit “ intellectual” awareness o f their deficits only. However, according to Toglia 
and Kirk (2000), and other theorists (for e.g. Crosson et al, 1989), this is only one 
aspect o f awareness of deficits. Intellectual awareness interacts with “online” 
awareness to create an individual’s self awareness (Toglia and Kirk, 2000). Online 
awareness is the awareness of functional deficits as they occur and the ability to 
anticipate them.
A measure o f online awareness may be obtained if the patient is assessed carrying 
out a task ‘live’. The discrepancy between the patient’s rating o f their performance 
on the task and a rating of their objective performance can be used as a measure of 
online awareness. Two studies attempted to measure both intellectual and online 
awareness (Goverover, 2004; Schmitter-Edgecombe and Woo, 2004). Unfortunately 
Goverover (2004) averaged across their assessments o f patients’ intellectual and 
online awareness so findings regarding the relationship o f executive function to these 
separate aspects o f awareness were not made.
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Schmitter-Edgecombe and Woo (2004) asked patients to predict how many units of 
material they thought they would remember in immediate and delayed recall, and 
confidence ratings in their predictions, before exposure to the material to be 
remembered, and after. This was done for the three memory tasks used -  Logical 
Memory I, Visual Reproduction I and II from the Wechsler Memory Scale Revised 
and list learning in the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT). The pre-exposure 
question was designed to assess intellectual awareness, and the second question was 
designed to assess online awareness. Predictions across the tasks were collapsed.
This study found that the measure o f intellectual awareness was correlated with three 
o f the five executive tests used -  the Stroop task, Trails A and B, and the 
Initiation/perseveration scale from the Dementia Rating Scale. It was not related to 
the WCST or the FAS test. This relationship could not be attributed to a more 
generalised cognitive deficit as no relationship was found between ISA and IQ.
There were no correlations between the online awareness measure and the executive 
tests. The authors explained this result as a consequence o f online awareness being 
updated following exposure to the task. In other words patients used information 
from practice to update online memory self-knowledge.
Studies of the role of executive function in ISA after brain injury have been 
informative in that they have used different indices of awareness and finding 
different patterns of associations with executive tests.
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1.6 Studies o f executive function and ISA in Psychosis
Studies in patients with psychosis also point to a link between lack o f insight and 
impaired executive function, often measured by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST) (Cooke et al, 2005).
A pilot study with first-episode schizophrenia patients by Koren et al (2004) was 
driven by a view that the hypothesized relationship between executive function and 
insight tested in previous studies was simplistic. The major limitation was felt to be a 
failure to address deficits at the “metacognitive” level. The authors define 
metacognition as a person's awareness or knowledge of their cognitive abilities. 
Borrowing concepts from Koriat and Goldsmith's (1994) paradigm developed to 
study monitoring and control processes in memory test performance, Koren et al
(2004) distinguished between tasks using a 'forced choice' response format and those 
using a “free response” format. Tasks using a 'forced choice' response format do not 
allow patients the choice of volunteering or withholding their answers. “Free 
response” format tasks give patients a choice in volunteering answers. Removing 
control over responding from the patient in forced response format reduces the 
ecological validity o f tests, as in daily life patients may withhold actions if they feel 
uncertain o f their appropriateness. Koren et al (2004) argue that monitoring 
(subjective appraisal of the correctness of potential responses) and control 
(determining whether or not to volunteer the response) are important aspects of 
metacognition. Their study aimed to explore the links between insight in 
schizophrenia and cognitive versus metacognitive skills.
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The WCST was adapted to incorporate a measure of metacognitive skills. While 
carrying out the WCST, participants were asked to rate their confidence in the 
correctness o f their sort from 0 to 100, and to choose whether the sort should count 
towards their overall score. Thus in addition to the 'forced response' performance that 
reflected the patient's ability to perform the sorting task, this additional procedure 
yielded measures of'free response' performance dependent on the patient's 
metacognition. Several metacognitive variables were calculated. Insight was assessed 
using the Scale to Assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD - Amador and 
Strauss 1990), a semi-structured interview, assessing several aspects o f awareness of 
schizophrenia.
None o f the correlations between the conventional WCST scores and the insight 
measures reached significance. In contrast, several correlations between the 
metacognitive measures and the insight measures reached significance. These 
relationships remained when the potential confounding effect o f IQ was controlled 
for. In regression analyses, the metacognitive variables accounted for moderate to 
high variance in general insight and awareness of current symptoms whereas the 
conventional WCST scores accounted for a rather small proportion o f variance. 
Koren et al (2004) concluded that poor insight is more strongly related to deficits at 
the metacognitive level than to cognitive deficits per se.
1.7 Current Study
The aim o f this study was to examine whether impaired metacognitive skills 
contribute to ISA after brain injury more than broader executive functions. The
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executive function test used in this study was the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1997). Following from Koren et al’s (2004) study, the 
‘metacognitive’ adaptation applied to this test would be to ask patients to give their 
confidence rating in the correctness o f each guess. Self-awareness o f deficits was 
assessed by the Awareness Questionnaire discrepancy score between Patient and 
Significant Other’s report. A measure of depression and anxiety, the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale, was also taken to assess levels of emotional distress 
in the sample and to allow examination o f its relation to ISA.
1.8 Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were proposed:
1. Greater impairment of executive functioning will be associated with greater 
impairment in self awareness o f deficits.
2. Greater impairment of metacognitive skills will be associated with greater 
impairment in self awareness o f deficits.
3. There will be a greater association between impaired metacognitive skills and ISA 
than between impaired executive functioning and ISA.
4. Greater impairment of metacognitive skills will be associated with greater 
impairment of executive functioning.
5. Greater levels o f self awareness o f deficits will be associated with greater levels of 
anxiety and depression.
6. Patients with lesions in the frontal lobes will have greater ISA than those with 
lesions in other areas of the brain.
7. There will be no difference in ISA according to brain injury severity.
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2. METHOD
2.1 Sample
Participants were recruited from a Brain Injury Rehabilitation Unit at a Community 
Hospital which specialises in complex cases o f brain injury. Patients attending the 
unit for assessment of their suitability for rehabilitation were asked to take part in the 
study. Patients were included if they had a main current diagnosis o f brain injury o f 
various aetiologies and were able to communicate adequately for the oral and written 
assessments. No exclusion criteria were set for participants. In Koren et al’s (2004) 
study, the median significant correlation between measures o f awareness and 
metacognition was 0.44. For this study to detect a similar effect size with 80% power 
and alpha set at 0.05, a sample size o f 38 would be needed.
2.2 Procedure
Patients were approached and asked to take part in the study at the end o f their 
assessment appointment. Testing for the study took on average thirty minutes. After 
information was given about the study and written consent taken, the National Adult 
Reading Test (NART) was administered, followed by the Brixton Test, which was 
followed by completion of the Awareness Questionnaire and Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS). The tests were administered in the same order for all 
participants.
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2.3. Measures
The following tests and measures were administered.
2.3.1 Awareness Questionnaire (Sherer et al 1998)
The patient and a ‘significant other’ completed this questionnaire, which consists of 
17 items assessing awareness of changes in cognitive, behavioural, affective, motor 
and sensory functioning after brain injury.
In this study, patients’ awareness was measured by the discrepancy between the 
patient’s questionnaire and a significant other’s. The questionnaire requires raters to 
indicate how well the patient can perform in various areas at the time the 
questionnaire is completed, compared to how well the patient could perform prior to 
injury. Questions on the patient version are phrased "How good is/How well can you 
[perform a function] compared to before your injury?" and patients are asked to rate 
their functioning on a 5 point scale from "Much worse" "Worse" "the Same" "Better" 
or "Much Better". The significant other's questions are the same except they ask the 
respondent to rate the patient's functioning. Higher scores indicate worse functioning.
The questionnaire has the advantage o f prompting the respondent to report changes 
in functioning since brain injury, rather than asking general questions about 
functioning, as other questionnaires such as the PCRS and DEX do. The factor 
structure has been described. A factor analysis led to a three factor solution: 
Cognitive (seven items), Behavioural/Affective (six items), and Motor/Sensory (four
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items). These accounted for 48.5% o f the variance (Sherer et al 1995). Such a factor 
structure would allow exploration o f whether ISA varies as a function o f type of 
deficit in exploratory analyses.
Consistent findings between studies using the Awareness Questionnaire with those 
using other indicators of awareness point to the validity o f its as a measure o f ISA. 
The study by Sherer et al (1995) replicated previous findings that brain injury 
patients were more aware o f physical impairments than cognitive or behavioural ones 
(Hendryx 1989; Anderson and Tranel 1989; Prigitano and Altman 1990). Also 
consistent with previous results (Gasquoine 1992), Sherer et al (1995) found that 
patients were more accurate at rating functioning in specific situations compared to 
general ones. Consistent with empirical studies that show a dissociation between 
awareness for physical as opposed to non-physical sequelae o f brain injury (Hendryx 
1989, Anderson and Tranel 1989) a factor analysis of the questionnaire found 
multiple factors underlying self awareness. The factor structure found was similar to 
that found in a previous study using the Head Injury Family Interview (Kay et al 
1995). Also Sherer et al (1996) found that family members and clinicians agreed 
more closely with each other than either did with patients' self ratings o f physical 
functioning. Sherer et al (1997) found that impaired awareness measured by the 
patient -  family member discrepancy score was predictive o f long term employment 
outcome.
Cronbach's alpha was 0.88 for the total scale and ranged between 0.68 and 0.80 for 
the factors on the patient form. For the ‘significant other’ form it was 0.88 for the
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total scale and ranged from 0.57 and 0.80 for the three factors, indicating generally 
quite strong internal reliability (Sherer et al 1995).
This questionnaire method o f assessing ISA was felt to be preferable as due to time 
constraints a relatively quick and simple method of assessment was required. The 
questionnaire format would maximise collection of data as it would allow completion 
outside the research time in the hospital setting. Although the use o f other methods of 
assessing ISA, such as interview and assessment while ‘on task’ would also be 
desirable, this was not possible given time constraints on testing.
2.3.2 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HAPS: Zigmond and Snaith. 1983)
The HADS is a questionnaire which provides a brief state measure o f anxiety and 
depression. Fourteen items are rated on a 4-point scale to reflect how an individual 
has been feeling in the past week on a range of symptoms related to depression and 
anxiety.
Each item is scored from 0 to 3 and so total scores range from 0 to 21 for each of the 
anxiety and depression subscales. Higher scores indicate greater anxiety or 
depression. Scores from 8 to 10 on each scale have been taken to indicate possible 
clinical disorder and from 11 to 21 to indicate probable clinical disorder. The four 
score ranges can be classified into 'normal' (0-7), 'mild' (8-10), 'moderate' (11-14), 
and 'severe ' (15-21).
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An advantage o f the HADS is that it was designed for use in medical out-patient 
clinics to detect clinical cases o f anxiety and depression and to assess the severity o f 
anxiety and depression, without contamination o f scores by reports o f physical 
symptomatology.
Good psychometric properties have been reported, based on specific populations of 
medical outpatients and people with cancer. Internal consistency assessed by 
Cronbach's alpha was 0.93 for anxiety and 0.90 for depression (Moorey et al 1991). 
Concurrent validity (r=0.54 for anxiety, r=0.79 for depression) was found with 5- 
point psychiatric rating scales o f anxiety and depression for 100 medical out patients 
(Zigmond and Snaith 1983). Construct validity as a measure of two factors was 
confirmed by factor analysis in a study of cancer patients by Moorey et al (1991).
2.3.3 Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess and Shallice 1997)
The Brixton Test consists o f a 56 page stimulus book, each page o f which shows the 
same array o f ten circles set in two rows of five, with each circle numbered from one 
to ten. On each page, one o f the circles is filled in blue. The position o f this filled 
circle differs on most presentations from page to page. The subject is shown one 
page at a time and is asked to consider where the next filled position will be, by 
trying to see a pattern or ‘rule’ based on what they have seen on previous pages. The 
number o f errors made by the subject is converted to a scaled score. There is no one 
reason for failure on the Brixton test. There are three broad classes o f error: 
perseverations (repeating one’s response); misapplication of a strategy; ‘guessing’ or 
‘bizarre responses’ (Burgess and Shallice, 1996a).
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The test is a concept or ‘rule’ attainment and rule following task. Burgess and 
Shallice (1997) contend that impairments on such tasks are possibly the most 
commonly demonstrated in people with dysexecutive problems. The WCST is the 
most well known test in this class and is known to present problems for patients with 
frontal lobe lesions. The Brixton Test is designed to be a more straightforward, 
pleasant, and quicker test for subjects than other tests.
The test was standardised on patients aged between 18 and 75 years. Patients with 
unilateral anterior lesions were significantly poorer than the posteriors or the control 
group, with the posterior lesion group not being significantly different from the 
control group.
Test-retest reliability was 0.71 (p<0.001), comparing well to that obtained for 
Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices Set 1 (Raven 1943), from the same group.
The Brixton score was found to be significantly negatively correlated (r = -0.343) 
with age, and significantly correlated with the NART predicted IQ (r = 0.278).
The test was anticipated to be less frustrating for brain injury patients than the WCST 
as some rules are relatively easy to pick up. Importantly, it was possible to apply the 
metacognitive measure to this test as the patient is required to make 54 guesses as to 
the location o f the blue circle and their confidence from 0-100 in each guess could be 
ascertained. Calculating the metacognitive measure across this large potential
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number o f guesses would allow for a more refined measure than if a global rating o f 
performance was asked for.
2.3.4 Metacognitive measure
In the study by Koren et al (2004) the metacognitive measure, which they termed 
'monitoring resolution', was the Kruskal-Goodman gamma correlation between the 
level o f confidence in the correctness o f each Wisconsin Card Sorting Test sort and 
its actual correctness. Other indices o f metacognition used by Koren et al (2004) 
were felt to be potentially too burdensome for patients and could interfere with 
Brixton Test performance, so only this measure of metacognition was used. However 
in this study it was the Kruskal-Goodman gamma correlation between level of 
confidence in the correctness of their guess and whether the guess was correct or not 
across all trials on the Brixton test.
2.3.5 National Adult Reading Test (NART) (Nelson and Willison 1991)
This was administered in order to estimate the patients' premorbid IQ so that any 
contribution o f level of intellectual function to levels o f self-awareness could be 
detected.
The NART was designed to provide a means of estimating the premorbid 
intelligence o f adult patients suspected of suffering from intellectual deterioration. It 
consists o f a list o f 50 words, all 'irregular', such that application of common 
grapheme-phoneme and stress rules would result in incorrect pronunciation. Thus
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they can only be read correctly if  the subject knows and recognises them in their 
written form. The subject is required to read aloud the words and the number of 
errors o f pronounciation are recorded. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -  revised 
(W AIS-R) Full-Scale IQ can be predicted from this error score by inserting it into 
the appropriate formula.
The validity o f the test is based on the finding that vocabulary and general 
intelligence are highly correlated and that word reading ability tends to be preserved 
in general intellectual deterioration. Nelson and McKenna (1975) demonstrated in a 
group o f 98 adults that WAIS Full-Scale IQ and Schonell Graded Word Reading Test 
score was correlated, r = 0.75. Nelson and O'Connell (1978) administered the NART 
and Schonell to 40 patients with bilateral cortical atrophy. This group had a 
significantly lower IQ as measured by the WAIS compared to a control group, but 
their NART error scores were not significantly different to the control group, 
indicating the test's validity in estimating premorbid intellectual function.
The advantages o f using the NART are that it is a short, simple task that is less 
stressful than most other cognitive tests, requires relatively little effort and is 
relatively unaffected by poor concentration or motivation.
The NART may not be appropriate for a subject whose first language is not English 
or for a subject who may not have been exposed to English language to an extent 
expected to be congruent with intellectual ability. Use of the NART to predict 
premorbid IQ in such cases would lead to an underestimation of premorbid IQ and 
such cases would be treated with caution.
2.4. Statistical Analyses
It was planned to run correlations between the Awareness Questionnaire discrepancy 
score, the Brixton Test score, and the metacognitive score, and between the 
Awareness Questionnaire discrepancy score and the Anxiety and Depression 
subscale scores from the HADS. It was planned to enter the Brixton test score, the 
metacognitive score, the HADS scores and NART into a regression analysis in order 
to determine which of these variables contributed to the Awareness Questionnaire 
discrepancy score. Patients would be categorised according to the site of their brain 
damage, and according to level of injury severity. T-tests would be carried out to 
determine whether levels of ISA differed between these groups.
3. RESULTS
3.1 Recruitment of Sample
Recruitment took place over 7 months from September 2006 to March 2007. Thirty 
patients were recruited. Twenty-three patients attended assessment appointments 
during the recruitment period but were not recruited for the following reasons. Seven 
could not participate in the assessment appointment adequately because o f the extent 
o f their cognitive impairment or for medical reasons. Three were difficult to engage 
in the assessment, because o f an uncooperative attitude. Five declined to take part in 
the current study. Three patients began the testing for the study but could not 
complete either the Brixton test or the metacognitive aspect adequately. Two were
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inappropriate referrals to the service and did not have a clear diagnosis of brain 
injury. Three needed an interpreter and it was felt that testing would take too long 
with interpreting and could become tiring for the patients.
3.2 Sample characteristics
A summary o f the sample’s characteristics is given in the table below. 
Table 1. Sample Characteristics
Sex Male 24 (80%)
Female 6 (20%)
Age (years) Mean 47.3
Range 19-75
Cause of brain injury TBI as a result o f a fall, road
traffic accident or assault 15 (50%)
Cerebrovascular cause 12 (40%)
Viral encephalitis 3 (10%)
Severity of brain injury Mild 9 (30%)
Moderate 5 (17%)
Severe 9 (30%)
Not available 7 (23%)
Location of brain injury Anterior 13 (43%)
Posterior 12 (40%)
Not available 5 (17%)
Time since injury (months) Mean 32.20
s.d. 48.34
range 1.25- 192
History of alcohol/drug misuse_________________________________ 8 (27%)
Information on the severity o f brain damage was obtained from the patients’ notes. 
This was in the form of Glasgow Coma Scale score, length o f post-traumatic amnesia 
(PTA), or length of coma. This information was classified into indicating ‘mild’, 
‘moderate’ or ‘severe’ injury according to Sohlberg and Mateer (2001 )’s criteria. 
When more than one index o f brain injury severity was available in the medical 
notes, the most severe index was used. Information on the location o f the patients’ 
lesions was obtained from their medical notes. The lesion location was classified
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according to Burgess and Shallice’s (1997) method. They were classified as 
‘anterior’ if the frontal lobes were involved and ‘posterior’ if  the lesion was 
elsewhere in the cortex but not in the frontal lobes.
3.3. Summary o f Scores on Measures
Table 2. Summary o f Scores on Measures
Measure Mean fs.d.) Range
AQ Discrepancy Score
Total 5.2 (8.9) -14 to 26
Cognitive factor 2.2 (0.8) -8 to 11
Behavioural/affective 2.1 (0.8) -5 to 7
Motor/sensory 0.15 (0.4) -3 to 4
Brixton Test 4.76 (0.5) 1 to 10
Metacognitive Score -0.44 (0.45) -1.0 to 0.69
HADS Anxiety 8 (4.5) 1 to 18
HADS Depression 6.45 (5.2) Oto 18
NART predicted WAIS-R FSIQ 97.8(12.0) 77 to 124
Awareness Questionnaire (A P I
The ‘significant other’s AQ was completed by the spouse or partner in 18 cases, by a 
parent in 7 cases, and by a sibling or other relative in 5 cases. The discrepancy
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between the Patients’ AQ total and their significant other’s AQ total was calculated. 
There was a large range in patients’ perceptions o f their functioning, varying from 
being worse than their significant others’ ratings to being far better. The factors of 
cognitive, behavioural/affective, and motor/sensory functioning were calculated 
according to Sherer et al (1998) for each patient. The cognitive and 
behavioural/affective factor means indicate less accurate self awareness in these 
domains than in the motor/sensory domain.
Brixton Spatial Anticipation test
The Brixton scaled score indicates that performance on this test was lower than the 
average scaled score of 7.
Metacognitive Score
The mean o f the Kruskal-Goodman gamma correlation between the level of 
confidence in the correctness o f each Brixton Test trial guess (0-100) and its actual 
correctness (0- incorrect, 1- correct) was negative. This indicates that on average 
across the sample, there was not an association between the correctness o f each guess 
and the patients’ confidence in the correctness o f their guess.
HADS
The mean HADS anxiety score indicates a ‘mild’ level o f anxiety across the sample. 
The mean HADS depression score remains in the ‘normal’ range.
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NART
The mean NART predicted WAIS-R FSIQ was close to the average IQ o f 100 
(s.d.=15).
3.4. Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1:
The first hypothesis was that the Brixton error score will be correlated with the AQ 
discrepancy score - the greater the impairment on the Brixton test, the greater the 
discrepancy score will be. The Pearson’s r was calculated as both these sets o f data 
fulfilled assumptions underlying this test. This was nonsignificant -  r = .032, p = .87. 
Therefore the first hypothesis was not supported.
Hypothesis 2:
The second hypothesis was that the metacognitive score will be negatively correlated 
with the AQ discrepancy score - the larger the metacognitive measure, the smaller 
the discrepancy score will be. Both these sets of data fulfilled assumptions 
underlying the Pearson’s r. This was nonsignificant, r = -.359, p= .061. Therefore the 
second hypothesis was not supported.
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Hypothesis 3:
The third hypothesis, that the metacognitive score will explain greater variance in the 
AQ discrepancy score than the Brixton error score, became redundant as a significant 
association between either of these two variables and the AQ discrepancy score was 
not found.
Hypothesis 4:
The fourth hypothesis was that the metacognitive score will be correlated with the 
Brixton error score -  the larger the metacognitive measure, the smaller the Brixton 
error score will be. The Pearson’s r was nonsignificant, r = .231, p=.229.
Hypothesis 5:
The fifth hypothesis was that the AQ discrepancy score would be correlated with the 
HADS Anxiety and Depression scores - greater self awareness o f deficits will be 
associated with greater levels o f anxiety and depression.
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Table-2. Pearson’s r correlations between Awareness Questionnaire score and HADS
AQ
discrepancy
total
AQ cognitive 
factor
AQ
behavioural/
affective
factor
AQ sensory/ 
motor factor
HADS
Anxiety
-.632 (p< 001) -.676 (p<001) -.341 (p=.120) -.429 (p=.029)
HADS
Depression
-.558 (p=.002) -.658 (p=.001) -.387 (p=.075) -.149 (p=.469)
The Anxiety score was significantly associated with the total discrepancy score and 
the two factors, cognitive and sensory/motor functioning. This suggests that with 
greater self-awareness, patients had greater levels of anxiety. The Depression score 
was significantly associated with the total AQ discrepancy score and the AQ 
cognitive factor. With greater self-awareness, patients had greater levels o f 
depression.
Hypothesis 6 :
The sixth hypothesis was that patients with lesions in the frontal lobes will have 
greater ISA than those with lesions in other areas of the brain.
An independent samples t test was carried out to determine whether AQ scores 
differed according to lesion site. The mean total AQ discrepancy score was 8.54
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(8.06) for the frontal lesion group, and 0.13 (10.06) for the posterior group, t (19) =
2.116, p = .048. It appears that patients with lesions involving the frontal lobes have 
poorer self-awareness than those with lesions in the posterior parts of the brain.
Hypothesis 7:
The seventh hypothesis was that there will be no difference in ISA according to brain 
injury severity. An independent-samples t-test found that there was no significant 
difference in AQ scores according to level o f severity o f brain damage.
3.5. Exploratory Analyses
Exploratory analyses were carried out to see whether other variables were associated 
with the AQ discrepancy score.
Pearson correlations were run between AQ discrepancy score, the three AQ factors, 
and age, NART predicted WAIS-R FSIQ, as these fulfilled assumptions underlying 
Pearson’s correlations. These are shown in the table below.
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Table 3. Exploratory correlations
AQ
discrepancy
total
AQ cognitive 
factor
AQ
behavioural/ 
affective factor
AQ sensory/ 
motor factor
Age .209 (p=.296) .431 (p==028) .285 (p=.210) .141 (p=.50)
NART
predicted
WAIS-R
FSIQ
.132 (p= 521) .01 (p= 964) -.107 (p=.655) .388 (p=.061)
The cognitive factor discrepancy score was found to be associated with age, 
indicating that with increasing age patients are less aware o f their cognitive deficits. 
The NART predicted FSIQ was not associated with levels of self-awareness.
4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Summary of results
The first hypothesis, that greater impairment of executive functioning will be 
associated with greater impairment in self-awareness of deficits, was not supported. 
There was no association between the Awareness Questionnaire discrepancy score 
and the Brixton Test score. The second hypothesis, that greater impairment of 
metacognitive skills will be associated with greater impairment in self-awareness of
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deficits was not supported. The association between the metacognitive measure and 
the Awareness Questionnaire discrepancy score was in the expected direction but did 
not reach significance (r = -.359, p= .061). The third hypothesis, that there will be a 
greater association between impaired metacognitive skills and ISA compared to 
impaired executive functioning and ISA, became redundant as a significant 
association between either of these two variables and SA discrepancy score was not 
found. The fourth hypothesis, that greater impairment of metacognitive skills will be 
associated with greater impairment o f executive functioning, was not supported.
The fifth hypothesis, that greater self-awareness of deficits will be associated with 
greater levels o f anxiety and depression was supported. The HADS Anxiety score 
was found to be associated with the total Awareness Questionnaire discrepancy score 
and its two factors, cognitive and sensory/motor functioning. The HADS Depression 
score was associated with the AQ discrepancy score and the cognitive factor. This 
suggests that with greater self awareness levels, patients had greater levels o f anxiety 
and depression.
The sixth hypothesis, that patients with lesions in the frontal lobes will have greater 
ISA than those with lesions in other areas of the brain was supported. Patients with 
lesions involving the frontal lobes were found to have poorer self awareness than 
those with lesions in the posterior parts of the brain.
The seventh hypothesis that there will be no difference in ISA according to brain 
injury severity was supported. There was no significant difference in AQ scores 
according to level o f severity o f brain damage.
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Exploratory analyses found the AQ cognitive factor discrepancy score was found to 
be associated with age indicating that with age, patients become less aware o f their 
cognitive deficits.
4.2 Theoretical Implications
The finding that executive function, as measured by the Brixton Test, was not 
associated with the ISA measure was surprising but not unprecedented. It indicates 
that in this sample ISA was not related to impairments in executive abilities 
pertaining to rule attainment and rule shifting. No previous studies were identified 
that used the Brixton Test to study the relationship o f executive function to ISA . 
Other studies have found a lack of association between other executive function 
measures and ISA (Anson and Ponsford, 2006; Noe et al 2005; Goverover, 2004; 
Burgess et al 1998). This study adds to the mixed findings with regard to this 
relationship. The finding runs counter to predictions made by models o f ISA such as 
those by Toglia and Kirk (2000) that propose executive abilities to play a role in the 
construction o f ISA.
The finding that the metacognitive measure was not significantly associated with the 
Awareness Questionnaire Discrepancy score ran contrary to the hypothesis. However 
the association was in the expected direction. This means that for this sample o f brain 
injury patients a measure o f their awareness of their performance on the Brixton Test 
was not significantly associated with the measure of their general intellectual 
awareness o f their deficits in functioning. This runs counter to the relationship found
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by Koren et al (2004) where measures o f metacognition were found to be associated 
with patients’ awareness o f their condition o f schizophrenia. Toglia and Kirk’s 
(2000) model would also predict an association between the measure o f 
metacognition used in this study, which could be conceived o f as a measure of 
“online” awareness in their terminology, and “intellectual” ISA, as measured by the 
Awareness Questionnaire. This is because online and intellectual awareness are 
posited to interact in the creation o f self awareness.
The metacognitive score was not associated with the Brixton score. As the 
metacognitive measure asked patients to indicate their confidence in whether their 
guess was correct or not, it could be considered to be a measure of ‘self-monitoring’. 
Self monitoring has been classed as an aspect o f executive function (Spreen & 
Strauss, 1998) this result could be taken to indicate that these two executive 
processes are dissociated. The result is consistent with a study by Shmitter- 
Edgecombe and Woo (2004) which also found that the measure o f online monitoring, 
a rating how well patients thought they were doing on memory tasks, was not 
associated with tests of executive function . t
The finding that greater levels o f anxiety and depression were associated with better 
self-awareness is consistent with previous findings of a relationship between 
emotional distress and greater self-awareness o f deficits (Godfrey et al 1993;
Ranseen et al 1990; Heilbronner et al, 1989). Such findings have been taken as 
evidence for a “denial” model of ISA (eg Weinstein and Kahn, 1955) in which the 
denial o f impairments serves to protect the individual from confronting the
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implications o f the impairments for their functioning and self-esteem. Such models 
suggest a causal relationship between ISA and levels o f emotional distress.
Vuilleumier (2004) presents an alternative picture. The presence of an abnormal 
affective drive to respond to uncertainties about current bodily states or current 
cognitive abilities (Vuilleumier, 2000) may impede the normal cognitive processes 
involved in constructing an up to date awareness o f self. Affective signals can exert 
influences on cognitive processing and may be necessary to activate appraisal 
operations that allow the adjustment o f behaviour and beliefs in the face o f novel 
situations (Tiedens and Linton 2001). A reduced emotional impact o f perceived 
failure might contribute in this way to impede discovery of the deficit by the patient. 
The finding o f this study may lend support to Vuilleumier’s (2004) proposal that a 
decreased capacity for affect goes alongside an outdated construction o f the self.
A study by Andersson et al (1999) lends support to this hypothesis. TBI patients 
rated as apathetic, showed less psychophysiological reactivity from a neutral speech 
condition to a therapeutic interaction condition compared to patients rated as non- 
apathetic. The apathetic patients also reported less emotional discomfort in the 
therapeutic condition. ISA was associated with low autonomic reactivity. The results 
were interpreted to suggest that reduced psychophysiological reactivity in apathetic 
patients may be a correlate to their lack o f emotional responsivity, disengagement, 
lack o f insight, and concern about their situation.
Patients with lesions involving the frontal lobes had poorer self awareness than those 
with lesions in the posterior parts o f the brain. This finding is consistent with other
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studies (Gusnard et al 2001; Johnson et al 2002) and theory (Stuss 1991) that link 
ISA to the frontal lobes, particularly that it is circuits involving the frontal lobes that 
are involved in self awareness.
There was no significant difference in ISA scores according to level o f severity of 
brain damage. Previous findings as to the relationship between severity o f damage 
and ISA have been mixed (Prigatano, 1999; Allen and Ruff 1990; Anderson and 
Tranel 1989; Fleming et al 1998; Sbordone et al 1998). A possible reason for this 
may be damage to differing underlying mechanisms in the creation of self awareness.
The finding that the cognitive factor discrepancy score was associated with age 
indicates that over time, with increasing age, patients become less aware o f their 
cognitive deficits. This may reflect ISA of general cognitive decline over and above 
that caused by the brain injury. Levine’s (1990; 1991) Discovery Theory may explain 
why awareness of cognitive abilities in particular is compromised. According to this 
theory, an impairment has to be ‘discovered’ before it can be incorporated into 
beliefs about the self. Cognitive impairments, and other subtle alterations in 
functioning, may be difficult to detect, and individuals close to the person with brain 
injury may be more reluctant to identify changes in personality or intellectual 
function to the individual than physical changes. This would mean that such changes 
in functioning are less likely to be acknowledged by the individual. Such an 
explanation could also explain why the means of the cognitive and 
behavioural/affective factors of the Awareness Questionnaire indicated less accurate 
self awareness in these domains than in the motor/sensory domain.
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4.3. Limitations o f Study Design
The limitations in the design of this study should be borne in mind when considering 
its findings.
4.3.1 ISA measure
It may be that the measure o f ISA used is not an accurate reflection o f ISA in the 
patients. The method used assumes that the patient and significant other are able to 
provide an accurate report of the patient's abilities. Factors interfering with this for 
the patient’s report are cognitive deficits other than ISA that may influence patients' 
report such as memory or language problems. It may be that the patient has not had 
adequate opportunity to experience difficulties in particular areas o f functioning and 
so remains ignorant o f them. This may apply to items of the Awareness 
Questionnaire that ask about the patient’s ability to live independently, plan things, 
and manage money.
The significant other’s report of the patients functioning may be affected by stress, 
fatigue, lack of knowledge, and frustration in managing the patients' challenging 
behaviour. DeBettignies et al (1990) found that the distress level o f relatives of 
patients with Alzheimers’ Dementia correlated with how they perceived the patients’ 
ISA. Prigatano et al (2005) found a similar result in relatives o f patients with TBI.
The failure to find a significant association between the metacognitive measure and 
the measure o f ISA, as Koren et al (2004) did, may be due to differences in the way
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ISA was assessed in this study. Koren et al (2004) assessed ISA by interview with a 
clinician who asked about patients’ awareness o f symptoms that had been identified 
as ones they did experience. Such an assessment may have been more accurate than 
the questionnaire assessment of awareness of a standard set o f deficits used in this 
study.
4.3.2 Executive function measure
The Brixton Test is a measure o f specific executive abilities. It was designed to be a 
test o f concept or ‘rule’ attainment and rule following. Burgess and Shallice (1997) 
contend that impairments on such tasks are possibly the most commonly 
demonstrated in people with dysexecutive problems. The WCST is the most well 
known test in this class and the Brixton Test is designed to be a more 
straightforward, pleasant, and quicker test for subjects than other tests. The WCST 
has been found to be associated with ISA in studies by Burgess et al (1998) and Noe 
et al (2005).
The performance of patients on the Brixton Test may not actually be tapping their 
executive processing ability, but reflecting impairments in other cognitive processes 
that the Brixton Test relies on. These include short term memory, visuo-spatial 
memory and language comprehension. A way around this problem would be to 
assess these other cognitive processes that the Brixton depends on and to assess 
whether Brixton Test performance is significantly associated with performance on 
these. If  this were the case, Brixton performance could be said to be influenced by 
impairments of these other cognitive processes and not be a valid measure of
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executive deficits. However the ethical and practical constraints on testing did not 
allow such additional testing to be possible.
4.3.3. Metacognitive measure
The measure of metacognition may not have accurately tapped the patients' level of 
confidence in their guesses. It is possible that across the sample, patients rated their 
confidence inconsistently with different 'anchor' points. For example, some patients 
were observed to reason that since there were only ten potential answers, any of their 
guesses had at least a 10% chance o f being correct and they therefore kept this as 
their lowest possible guess. Other patients gave a “50 -  50” guess when they felt 
their answer could be equally correct or incorrect.
Providing a visual analogue scale as an alternative means of indicating their 
confidence in their guess would have helped those patients who may have had 
difficulty translating their judgement o f confidence into a percentage. Future studies 
could ask patients to think aloud while reasoning how confident they are. This would 
shed light on the process by which, and the knowledge they use, to arrive at their 
ratings o f confidence. It is possible that various cognitive impairments other than 
those specifically involved in self-monitoring interfered with patients making their 
ratings.
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4.3.4. Sample
The sample in this study was mixed with regard to a number o f factors. Twenty-three 
out of 53 patients attending the clinic were not able to participate in the study for 
reasons described in the results section. This is 43% of the potential participants.
This means that the sample recruited from this rehabilitation unit is not 
representative of the population o f patients presenting to the unit.
The sample varied with regard to cause of injury, severity, lesion location, time since 
injury, and history of excessive alcohol and/or illicit drug use.
The cause o f injury and injury severity will have implications for where the brain 
injury is likely to be. The characteristic neurological picture after closed head injury 
is o f diffuse rather than focal insult to the brain. There is a reduced efficiency over a 
wide range o f functions. In contrast, in penetrating head injury there may be 
complete destruction of a particular area of the brain resulting in the loss of a 
capacity such as language, or movement of a limb (McKinlay and Gray, 1992). In the 
case o f stroke, since the blood supply to any area of the brain can be compromised, 
an extremely wide range o f cognitive deficits of varying severity can be seen 
(Skilbeck, 1992).
The Glasgow Coma Scale Score (GCS) score and duration o f coma are correlated 
with the amount o f damage to the central brain structures o f the corpus callosum, 
brainstem and cerebellum. (Wilson et al 1994). This would mean that that the 
damaged neural circuitry underlying the patients’ ISA is likely to have differed
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across patients because injury severity varied across the sample. This would mean 
that specific executive function deficits in ISA may only be relevant for a proportion 
o f the sample.
The variation in time since injury is likely to have impacted on the patients’ level o f 
ISA. With time, patients are more likely to ‘discover’ their impairments (Levine, 
1990; 1991) and so be aware of them. It is possible that during physiotherapeutic 
rehabilitation patients may have become aware of certain deficits. The sample is 
likely to have varied as to whether they received such intervention before their 
assessment at the Unit. This data was not collected. With awareness, patients may 
have learnt compensatory strategies to cope with their impairments and so may not 
see them as much o f a problem.
A significant proportion of the sample had a history of excessive alcohol and/or illicit 
drug use. This is known to affect brain function and the impact o f this may well have 
interfered with patients’ levels o f ISA, the mechanisms underlying this, and patients’ 
performance on the Brixton Test. According to Wilson and Wiedman (1992) many 
alcoholics are left with cognitive deficits varying from impairment o f an isolated 
cognitive function to global impairment o f intellect and memory. A study by Hovarth 
(1975) suggested that 10% of alcoholics have severe and persisting impairment. 
Polydrug use is associated with neuropsychological impairment and prolonged drug 
use has been associated with profound neuropsychological impairment (Wilson and 
Wiedman, 1992). However, such patients formed a significant part of the population 
o f patients presenting to the Unit. Had these patients been excluded to rule out the 
impact o f drug use, the results would have been less representative.
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A further possible reason for the lack o f replication o f Koren et a fs  (2004) findings 
is that the mechanisms underlying ISA in schizophrenic patients is likely to differ 
from the mechanism underlying ISA in patients with brain injury o f various 
aetiologies.
A power calculation was carried out but the recruitment target was not achieved. It 
could be the case that statistical associations did not reach significance as the study 
was underpowered.
4.4. Clinical Implications
The study replicates previous findings that anxiety and depression is raised with 
increased self-awareness o f deficits. This means that rehabilitation and clinical staff 
should be prepared to assess this, and have resources to address and manage it. They 
should be alert to the possibility of patients’ using alcohol or drugs to self medicate. 
Carers could also be educated about the likelihood of their relative to experience 
anxiety and depression. They could supported to cope with this and informed of 
strategies to manage it.
The study suggests that older patients are likely to be less aware of cognitive deficits. 
Care and rehabilitation staff could be alerted to this tendency and be prepared in 
management strategies. This would be particularly relevant to Brain Injury Units that 
receive patients with brain injury after stroke, which occurs in older persons 
(Skilbeck, 1992).
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The results suggest that in a complex brain injury sample ISA is not significantly 
related to deficits of executive function. Rehabilitation addressing self-awareness of 
deficits would therefore need to address deficits wider than those o f executive 
functions.
Patients presenting with lesions in the frontal lobes according to scan data should be 
anticipated to be more likely to have problems with ISA than those with lesions in 
posterior parts of the brain. Not only patients with severe levels o f brain injury 
should be anticipated to have ISA. Patients with mild injury severity could also 
present with ISA of deficits.
4.5. Future Research
The use o f broader methods of assessing ISA would be desirable. Assessment 
methods should be informed by an understanding of the various ways in which ISA 
can manifest. This study attempted to measure intellectual awareness o f deficits and 
online awareness of performance o f the Brixton Test. It did not assess awareness of 
consequences o f deficits.
Future research could focus on the other curious presentations o f ISA such as when 
ISA is restricted to only one deficit (specificity) or when ISA is expressed verbally 
but not behaviourally (partiality).
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Future studies should bear in mind the difficulties in assessing executive function. 
The problem o f ‘task impurity’ (Burgess, 1997) should be borne in mind. Cognitive 
tests which are able to control for the subordinate cognitive processes involved in 
executive tests should be utilised.
Samples o f patients should be better delineated in terms of lesion location, time since 
injury, and exclude premorbid conditions that would impact on cognitive function.
Studies could move away from a correlational design and study the development of 
self awareness over time. This could be informative as to which factors are pertinent 
in its development.
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PART III: CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
Study Development and Methodological Issues
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1 Introduction
This purpose o f this section is to discuss the process o f arriving at the topic o f study, 
the challenges posed by the research setting and to expand on the limitations of the 
study design.
2. Choice o f topic
My interest in this area stems from an interest in the field of neuropsychoanalysis. 
This field attempts to test, extend and integrate Freudian ideas with modern 
neuroscience. My initial interest was in studying the phenomenon o f confabulation. 
Confabulation is a neuropsychological disorder in which the patient suggests, and 
defends against reasonable evidence, an account of reality which is patently false. 
For example, that their hospital ward is actually a hotel, or that their husband is an 
imposter. Recent studies have looked at a possible role for emotion in confabulatory 
states - that confabulations might be accepted as versions of reality because of their 
affective consequences. For example, Fotopoulou et al (2007) found evidence that 
motivational factors contribute to confabulation, along with defective reality and 
temporality monitoring.
I expressed my interest in carrying out a study in the area of confabulation. The 
setting available to conduct the study was a Brain Injury Rehabilitation Unit at a 
Community Hospital. However my field supervisor could not guarantee access to 
patients who were confabulating for the duration of the testing period o f the study.
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An alternative topic of study was the more general phenomenon o f lack o f insight in 
brain injury patients. This was a more amenable alternative as a substantial 
proportion of brain injury patients present with lack o f insight (Prigitano & Altman, 
1990). Researchers have studied the role of emotion in producing this condition. 
Ownsworth et al (2002) found that neuropsychological factors including executive 
function, and psychological factors o f denial and personality, contributed to ISA. I 
considered conducting a study that would contribute to this area.
3. Ethical and Practical Considerations
A number o f practical and ethical considerations posed constraints on the 
methodology I could use for the study. Existing patients at the Unit were being tested 
extensively as part of another research project. It was anticipated that this group 
would be considered already ‘overstudied’ by the Ethics Committee. It was therefore 
decided to recruit study participants from the new patients presenting to the Unit. 
They would be less likely to have been subject to neuropsychological testing for 
research. Assessment appointments for new patients last two hours. These determine 
whether patients will be taken on for rehabilitation. It was important to complete all 
data collection and neuropsychological testing on the day o f this assessment 
appointment as the patients not accepted by the Unit may well have felt unwilling to 
participate in the research study on a later date. It was decided patients would be 
tested after their appointment times as it was unlikely that they would agree to 
arriving earlier than their appointment time. The total data collection and testing time 
for this study was restricted to 30 minutes as patients were likely to be tired and
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hungry by this point. Within this time information about the study would be given, 
consent taken, testing conducted, and payment given. The challenge was to create a 
study for which it would be possible to collect data in this time limit and make a 
contribution to the field o f ISA after brain injury.
4. Choice o f Study Design
Having looked at the literature on ISA after brain injury, it became apparent that 
several studies had addressed the role of executive function in ISA. The studies had 
used differing methodologies and conceptualisations o f ISA. My interest in the 
theoretical models on ISA led me to look at how the phenomenon had been 
understood in psychosis. A review by Cooke (2004) described theories o f lack of 
insight in psychosis. These were categorised as clinical models, neuropsychological 
models and denial models. It seemed that the approaches to the understanding o f lack 
o f insight in psychosis considered similar factors to those in the brain injury 
literature. The review described an interesting study by Koren et al (2004) which had 
approached the phenomenon from a new angle. The study discussed new methods of 
assessing cognitive processes involved in ISA in schizophrenic patients. Their study 
used a conventional executive function test (Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) with an 
adaptation to introduce the new measure. Such an approach could be applied in the 
circumstances available for the current study with brain injury patients. The 
relationships examined would be new and contribute to the literature on ISA after 
brain injury.
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5. Extended Discussion o f Limitations o f Study Design
5.1 Sample
The sample o f patients in the study was heterogeneous with regard to several 
important variables: lesion location, cause o f injury, severity of injury, time since 
injury, alcohol and drug misuse and age. Exclusion criteria were not imposed on the 
sample with regard to these variables for the study. This decision was taken as the 
constitution o f the patients presenting to the Unit within the study period could not 
be predicted. It was planned to recruit as wide a sample of patients as possible and 
address the variations in patient characteristics in the statistical analyses. As the Unit 
deals with complex brain injury it was likely that a substantial proportion o f patients 
would have a history of alcohol and drug use. Indeed a common cause o f traumatic 
brain injury is falls and these are often as a result of alcohol intoxication. Another 
common cause o f brain injury is stroke. This is usually a disease of later life with the 
average age o f people who suffer stroke being approximately 70 years (Skilbeck, 
1992). Imposition o f selection criteria on age would exclude such patients. The 
decisions to include such patients were made to obtain a larger sample at the expense 
o f a purer sample in terms o f brain dysfunction. Despite these attempts to make the 
sample inclusive, 43% of potential participants were not able to be recruited to the 
study for various reasons described in the Results section o f the Empirical Paper.
The variation o f lesion location in the sample has implications for the interpretation 
o f the findings. Studies o f executive function commonly use patients with relatively 
isolated frontal lobe lesions. This is because the performance o f such patients on
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executive tasks is less likely to be contaminated by impairment in peripheral 
cognitive systems. Any impairment in functioning can then be more confidently 
attributed to impairments in executive processes (Burgess 1997). The implications of 
the mixed sample for the current study are that impairment on the Brixton Test 
cannot be assumed to be due to impairment of executive processes. It may be due to 
deficits in other cognitive systems supporting the execution of the task. This would 
also be the case for the metacognitive measure.
5.2 ISA measure
The Awareness Questionnaire was chosen to assess ISA for a number o f reasons 
which have been described in previous sections, including that it is relatively quick 
to complete and asks about different areas o f functioning specifically after brain 
injury. Reasons for this measure of self-awareness possibly not being an accurate 
reflection o f patients’ ISA have been described in the Discussion to the Empirical 
Paper and will now be expanded.
Studies suggest that obtaining report of a patient’s functioning is complicated by 
several factors. Sherer et al (1998) identified that patients’ responses to specific 
questions about their injury-related impairments were more consistent with relatives' 
reports than patients’ responses to global questions. This suggests that a discrepancy 
between patients’ and others’ report may be due to an artefact of the questionnaire 
items rather than reflecting a difference in opinion regarding the patient’s 
capabilities. Global questions are likely to be interpreted in a more wide ranging way 
than specific questions. It could be argued that some items of the Awareness
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Questionnaire are rather vague and global in nature, for example, “How well 
organised are you?”, “How well can you get along with people?” . These items do not 
specify what activities the patient can organise, or who they are able to get along 
with. It is likely that the patient may differ in their ability to organise activities that 
are more or less demanding, and differ in their ability to get along with people they 
know well compared to those they have recently met. It is possible that patient and 
relative may interpret these vague items differently and so actually be reporting the 
patient’s ability to do different things.
Another study highlights that BI patients may be aware o f their current deficits but 
not what these may mean for their functioning in the future. This has been described 
as the “extension” o f awareness o f deficit (Marcel et al 2004). Tyerman and 
Humphrey (1984) found that TBI patients could provide accurate information on 
personal changes although they clung to unrealistic hopes for the future. All o f the 
items on the Awareness Questionnaire ask about patient’s abilities “now, as 
compared to before your injury” . A criticism of using the Awareness Questionnaire 
therefore is that it is not able to assess patients’ expectations for the future. It does 
not cover the possible range of extension of awareness of deficit.
A possible reason for patients’ ISA of cognitive deficits may be that it is harder to 
become aware of these deficits. A further reason may be that the consequences of 
executive problems are hard to comprehend and predict. For example, it is easier to 
comprehend that having a paralysed limb would result in difficulty walking than to 
comprehend that poor impulse control would lead to difficulty dealing with novel 
situations and interpersonal relationships (Port et al 2002).
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The significant other’s report o f the patients functioning may be affected by stress, 
fatigue, lack o f knowledge, and frustration in managing the patients' challenging 
behaviour. The following studies highlight how relatives’ distress, relationship to the 
patient, and their personality may affect their report of the patients’ deficits. 
Prigatano et al (2005) investigated the relationship between relatives’ judgement of 
their own distress level in helping the patient and their subsequent ratings of that 
person’s level o f awareness o f disturbances in their functioning. The family 
member’s level o f distress in trying to help the person was significantly correlated 
with their view o f the patient’s unawareness. McKinlay and Brooks (1984) found 
that parents o f a patient with TBI tended to cope better than did spouses and that 
neurotic personality types over-reported sequelae in their family member.
A study by McWilliams (1991) found that patients with TBI and their family 
members were largely optimistic about the future and felt that the patient would 
return to their pre-morbid self within a year. Relatives’ may therefore also have 
unrealistic attitudes towards their relatives’ deficits.
Port et al (2002) discuss reasons why a relative’s undertanding o f a patient’s deficits 
may not be realistic. It is possible that at an early stage post injury specific 
impairments may not have been manifest in a functional context. Family and friends 
may not have had the opportunity to observe the changes in everyday activities. This 
is particularly likely to be the case for patients who have been inpatients at the time 
of questionnaire completion. Their family may not notice changes until the person is 
discharged and attempts to resume their pre-injury life roles in work or at home. In
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these cases therapist report may be a more accurate measure of deficits. The sample 
o f patients in this study did consist o f some patients soon after their brain injury who 
had been inpatients in other settings before their assessment at the Unit. It is possible 
that relatives would not be aware of the functional deficits the patients may have.
The context o f this study may have influenced the report o f patients’ difficulties in 
functioning. Given that patients and relatives took part in the study after their 
assessment appointment, which would determine whether the patient was suitable for 
rehabilitation, they may have felt a need to stress the patient’s difficulties. They may 
not have understood that the research study was not part o f the clinic procedures, 
although they were informed of this verbally and in the Patient Information Sheet. 
Krefting (1990) explored the relationship between patients’ families and service 
providers and reported that patients and families may experience a double-bind in 
their communications with health professionals. Family members can face a dilemma 
in determining how much information it is safe to reveal to staff, especially if there 
are potential implications for rehabilitation.
5.3 Executive function measure
Burgess (1997) discusses the unique demands made by the nature o f executive 
function system on methodology in neuropsychology. Traditional methodology used 
in neuropsychology o f finding dissociations may be less useful in the study of 
executive function than in studying other aspects of cognitive function. One reason 
for this is the problem o f ‘task impurity’ -  that differential performance across 
executive tasks cannot be compared as the background demands differ across them.
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For example a dissociation between Trail-making and Cognitive Estimates may be a 
function o f motor slowing with age, combined with an improvement in performance 
on Cognitive Estimates with age due to greater life experience and semantic 
knowledge. Thus such a patient’s performance may say little about the nature o f their 
executive function per se. Studies by Wilson et al (1996) and Reitan (1971) support 
the view that many executive tasks tap a range o f processes incidental to their main 
purpose.
The Hayling Sentence Completion Test (Burgess and Shallice, 1997) was designed 
to overcome this problem of task impurity. Burgess and Shallice (1997) designed this 
task in which the background demands of the two parts o f the task are similar. In the 
first part o f the Hayling Test, the initiation condition, the patient is presented with a 
series o f sentences which have the last word omitted and asked to provide the word 
which completes the sentence. In the second part of the test, the inhibition condition, 
the patient is required to produce a word which does not fit at the end of the 
sentence. The extremely low correlations between the two sections suggest double 
dissociation between the processes supporting these skills. As discussed previously 
in the Discussion section o f the Empirical Paper, the Brixton Test performance 
cannot be assumed to be reflecting only executive abilities, as there were no tests 
controlling for the background demands o f the Brixton Test.
Rabbitt (1997) discusses a broader problem in the conceptualisation o f executive 
functions and their operationalisation in studies. Executive functions tend to be 
described in terms o f tests that dysexecutive patients fail on, rather than descriptions
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o f hypothesised functional aetiology. Performance indices in tests are often treated as 
directly equivalent to the hypothetical system characteristics specified in models. For 
example, terms such as ‘planning’, ‘inhibition’ and ‘concept shifting’ are not treated 
merely as descriptions o f task demands, but are also used as labels marking 
qualitative distinctions between the functional processes. Rabbitt (1997) challenges 
this tendency present in the literature to classify executive tasks according to the 
abilities they purport to measure. This is because a correspondence between 
behaviour on a task and putative cognitive processes cannot be assumed. 
Dissociations between outcomes on executive tests may not reflect actual 
fractionation o f underlying processes. Behavioural components such as ‘inhibition’, 
‘planning’, ‘monitoring’ and ‘control’ may appear logically different but it is 
possible that they are met by the same cognitive systems (Anderson 1993). This has 
implications for studies which attempt to find which executive tests are more 
associated with ISA than others, and suggests that such approaches may not be 
helpful in understanding the cognitive architecture supporting ISA. The present study 
could also be criticised for assumptions that the executive test and the metacognitive 
measure were assessing distinct putative cognitive processes.
A further difficulty arises when studies attempt to assess the relationship of cognitive 
processes to complex sequences of behaviour. Such behaviour sequences are 
inevitably carried out according to temporal and physical constraints. These 
constraints interfere further in relating behavioural outcome to the functional 
organisation o f the executive system (Rabbitt 1997). For example, the processes 
underlying planning and those that enable a person to execute a self-generated plan
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are theoretically separable, but they will not be empirically -  one cannot fail or 
succeed in carrying out a plan one has not made (Burgess 1997).
When executive function is being assessed by performance o f complex behavioural 
sequences with limited structural constraint, individual response style is likely to 
affect the incidence of certain types o f behaviour (Rabbitt 1997). This will increase 
variation in outcome on the task.
Individuals will also vary in how novel the demands of executive tasks are to them. 
Since executive function is held to coordinate the effective performance o f new or 
complex tasks, this variation in novelty to the individuals makes it difficult to know 
how much a task is tapping the executive process of interest. According to Rabbitt 
(1997), this is likely to weaken correlations between scores on executive tests and to 
contribute to failure to find patterns o f associations between performance on tests 
with logically similar demands. The above considerations would need to be borne in 
mind by studies attempting to assess executive function.
6. Development o f mv understanding of research into cognitive processes
The process o f researching, designing, carrying out and interpreting the findings of 
this study has increased my understanding and appreciation of several issues in 
research into cognitive function.
I have become aware o f the difficulties in studying cognitive processes. In particular 
I learnt that the subtle and elusive processes o f executive function are difficult to 
define, let alone operationalise. I realised that the finding of dissociations between
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tasks is not straightforward to interpret. Assembling ideal samples to study executive 
function is difficult in practice. I have become aware o f the many quandaries 
involved in research into the relation o f the brain to putative psychological 
constructs.
My understanding of the concept of self-awareness has developed from thinking o f it 
as a relatively simple, unitary and stable construct to conceiving of it as a 
multifaceted and dynamic construct with several dimensions. I have been intrigued to 
learn about the role emotion may play in arriving at self-awareness judgements. 1 am 
more aware o f the possibility o f bi-directional relationships between affect and 
cognitive processes. This development in my understanding of its nature has made 
me aware o f the challenges involved in attempting to measure and quantify a 
construct such as self-awareness. This increased understanding will help me to 
consider the validity and accuracy o f the measurement and quantification o f other 
psychological constructs when I encounter such research in the future and when 
conducting future research.
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APPENDICES
ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL LETTER
Barnet, Enfield & Haringey Local Research Ethics Committee
R&D Dept,
Royal National Orthopaedic Hospital 
Brockley Hill 
Stanmore 
HA7 4LP
Telephone:  
01 August 2006
Miss Kaneez Husain
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Sub-dept of Clinical Health Psychology, UCL
Gower Street
London
W C1E6BT
Dear Miss Husain
Full title of study: Awareness of Deficit after Brain Injury: relation to
executive function and access to rehabilitation 
REC reference number: 
The Research Ethics Committee reviewed the above application at the meeting held 
on 25 July 2006. Thank you for attending the meeting.
Ethical opinion
issues covered during the review:
• Discussion took place regarding the Awareness Questionnaire to he sent 
to the patient and significant other and the importance that the client and 
carer should not discuss it before completing.
The members o f the Committee present gave a favourable ethical opinion o f the 
above research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and 
supporting documentation.
Ethical review of research sites
The Committee agreed that all sites in this study should be exempt from site-specific 
assessment (SSA). There is no need to complete Part C o f the application form or to 
inform Local Research Ethics Committees (LRECs) about the research. The 
favourable opinion for the study applies to all sites involved in the research.
Conditions of approval
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The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the conditions set out 
in the attached document. You are advised to study the conditions carefully.
Approved documents
The documents reviewed and approved at the meeting were:
Date
Application l 07 July 2006
Investigator CV 07 July 2006
Protocol l 07 July 2006
Covering Letter 07 July 2006
Peer Review 07 April 2005
Questionnaire: (validated) l
Letter o f invitation to participant l
GP/Consultant Information Sheets l
Participant Information Sheet l 04 July 2006
Participant Consent Form l
CV Supervisor
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
Research governance approval
You should arrange for the R&D Department at all relevant NHS care organisations 
to be notified that the research will be taking place, and provide a copy of the REC 
application, the protocol and this letter.
All researchers and research collaborators who will be participating in the research at 
a NHS site must obtain final research governance approval before commencing any 
research procedures. Where a substantive contract is not held with the care 
organisation, it may be necessary for an honorary contract to be issued before 
approval for the research can be given.
Membership of the Committee
The members o f the Ethics Committee who were present at the meeting are listed on 
the attached sheet.
Statement of compliance
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard 
Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK.
Yours sincerely
Dr. Peter Savege 
Chair
Email: alison.okane@rnoh.nhs.uk
Enclosures: List o f names and professions o f members who were present at the
meeting and those who submitted written comments 
Standard approval
Copy to: University College London
Gower Street 
London
[R&D Department for NHS care organisation at lead site]
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PATIENT INFORMATION SHEET
Date: 04.07.06, Version: 1
Study Title: “Awareness of Difficulties after Brain Injury”
You are being invited to take part in a research study. This Information Sheet will help 
you understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully. Talk to others about the study if you 
wish.
• Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take 
part.
• Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.
Part 1 
What is the purpose of the study?
The purpose of the study is to look at what sort of mental skills help people to 
be aware of any difficulties they may have, after they have had a brain injury.
Why am I being asked to take part?
You have been asked to take part because you are a new patient at the Brain 
Injury Rehabilitation Unit (BIRU). We will also be asking all other new 
patients at BIRU during the study period to take part. The study will consist of 
about 40 patients.
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do, you will be 
given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form.
You are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason, and 
any information collected from you will be destroyed. A decision to withdraw 
at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect the standard of care 
you receive.
What will I have to do if I take part?
If you decide to take part, you are requested to complete some 
questionnaires. These questionnaires ask you and a member of your family 
or close friend, about any difficulties you may be experiencing after your 
brain injury, and any difficulties you may be having with your mood. You are 
also asked to stay behind for up to 30 minutes after your appointment at 
BIRU, in order to take part in two tasks: one is a quick reading task, and the 
other a picture game. These will take up to 15 minutes in all. These 
questionnaires and tasks are not given to patients as part of the standard 
assessment. You will be given £6 as a “thank you” for taking part in the 
study.
What is the benefit of taking part?
Taking part in the study is not expected to help you directly, but the 
information we get might help improve the treatment of people with brain 
injury.
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This completes Part 1 of the Information Sheet. If the information in Part 1 has interested 
you and you are considering participation, please continue to read the additional 
information in Part 2 before making any decision.
Part 2
Complaints and Concerns 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to 
speak with the researcher, Ms Kaneez Husain, who will do their best to 
answer your questions (Contact number: 020 8732 6700). Any complaint 
about the way you have been dealt with during the study will be addressed. If 
you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this through 
the NHS Complaints Procedure. Details can be obtained from the hospital.
Confidential Information 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research 
will be kept strictly confidential. Any information about you which leaves the 
hospital/surgery will have your name and address removed so that you 
cannot be recognised from it. It will be stored securely in an anonymous 
form, and only the researcher will be able to view identifiable data. It will be 
retained until September 2007, after which it will be disposed of securely.
Your GP will be notified of your participation in this trial, with your consent, 
and relevant clinicians will be contacted for relevant medical details, with your 
consent.
What will happen to the results of the study?
We intend to publish the results in a peer-reviewed journal. Participants will 
not be identified in any publication. A summary of the findings in lay language 
will be available from the Unit for patients who have taken part.
Who is organising and funding the research?
This study is a student research project. University College London (UCL) is 
sponsoring the research. The doctors involved in your care and the 
researcher are not being paid for including you in the study.
Who has reviewed the study?
This study was given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct in the NHS by 
the Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Research Ethics Committee.
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet
page 2 of 2
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Patient ID No.
CONSENT FORM
Title of Study: “Awareness of Difficulties after Brain Injury”
Name of Researcher: Kaneez Husain
Please initial box
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
(dated 04.07.06, version 1) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily.
□
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or 
legal rights being affected.
□
3. I understand that relevant clinicians may be contacted in order to access 
relevant sections of any of my medical notes. I give permission for the 
researcher to have access to my records.
□
4. I agree to my GP being informed of my participation in the study.
5. I agree to take part in the above study.
□
□
Name of Patient Signature Date:
Name of Researcher Signature Date:
W hen completed, 1 for patient; 1 for researcher site file; 1 (original) to be kept in medical notes.
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